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ABSTRACT
Phineas Gage, the man who survived impalement by a rod through
his head in 1848, is considered “one of the great medical curiosities
of all time.” While expert accounts of Gage's post-accident personality
changes are often wildly damning and distorted, recent research
shows that Gage mostly thrived, despite his trauma. Studying past
cases such as Gage’s helps us imagine—and prepare for—a future of
law and neuroscience in which scientific debates over the brain’s
functions remain fiery, and experts divisively control how we
characterize brain-injured defendants.
This Article examines how experts have long dominated the
neuroscience narrative in U.S. criminal cases, especially insanity
cases, which often concern a defendant’s brain damage or abnormality. To support these arguments, this Article reports the results of my
original Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study (“The Study”) examining
the criminal justice system's use of the insanity defense in all
criminal cases—totaling 8,358—which involved neuroscientific
evidence from 1900 to 2020.
The Study shows that, despite the increasing influx of neuroscientific evidence and its purportedly greater objectivity into the
criminal justice system, experts still sway how that evidence is cast
when it concerns a defendant claiming insanity. The Study’s results
also explain how experts for the defense and the prosecution vary in
their approaches. For example, defense experts employ narratives to
emphasize the impact of neuroscientific evidence on a defendant's
brain and behavior for purposes of mitigating punishment. In
contrast, prosecutors increasingly use accusations of malingering in
their attempts to win cases—claiming that defendants are lying
about their disorders. This Article concludes that in years hence,
courts may expect seemingly more impartial information derived
from neuroscientific tests to incorporate more accurate and precise
indicators of the human mental condition. Whether the field of
neuroscience will succeed in that quest will be one more question for
the future and the experts who still may try to shape it.
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INTRODUCTION
“We know the future only by the past we project into it.” 1
On September 13, 1848, Phineas Gage’s brain made history.2
Gage, a construction foreman, was working with his crew on a railway line in Cavendish, Vermont, when, in minutes, his life changed
forever.3 Without warning, an explosion erupted, propelling a threeand-a-half-foot iron rod straight through Gage’s head.4 The rod’s
trajectory was bizarre and inconceivable: it entered the left side of
Gage’s face behind his eye and then soared out of the top of his
skull.5 Landing thirty feet away, the rod was “smeared with brains
and blood.”6 Yet, what followed this tragedy would be most improbable of all. The twenty-five-year-old Gage survived.7 Immediately
after his injury, Gage was conscious, alert, speaking to those around
him, and walking, mostly unassisted.8 He would live for another
eleven years.9
The Gage case is considered “one of the great medical curiosities
of all time,”10 a staple in primary textbooks in neuroscience and
psychology, and a frequent citation in articles and reports.11 The
1. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST 3
(2002) (emphasis added).
2. See generally MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE
(2000) (detailing the life and legacy of Phineas Gage).
3. Id. at 368-80 (discussing how Gage acquired his fame).
4. See J. M. Harlow, Letter to the Editor, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, 39
BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 389, 389-93 (1848) [hereinafter Harlow 1848]; John M. Harlow,
Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar Through the Head, 2 PUBL’NS MASS. MED. SOC’Y
329, 330-31 (1868) [hereinafter Harlow 1868].
5. See Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 389-93; Harlow 1868, supra note 4, at 330-31.
6. Henry J. Bigelow, Dr. Harlow’s Case of Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar
Through the Head, 20 AM. J. MED. SCIS. 13, 14 (Isaac Hays ed., 1850); Harlow 1848, supra
note 4, at 390 (indicating the rod was “smeared with brain”).
7. See Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 389-90.
8. See id.
9. See MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 370.
10. Malcolm Macmillan, Inhibition and Phineas Gage: Repression and Sigmund Freud,
6 NEURO-PSYCHOANALYSIS 181, 182 (2004).
11. See, e.g., MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 304, 308-14 (noting the Gage case’s breadth);
Bhaskara P. Shelley, Footprints of Phineas Gage: Historical Beginnings on the Origins of
Brain and Behavior and the Birth of Cerebral Localizationism, 4 ARCHIVES MED. & HEALTH
SCIS. 280, 281 (2016) (explaining that Harlow’s 1848 article is “one of the most frequently
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injury was also the first opportunity to focus on such seemingly
complex qualities as judgment, temperament, and impulse control,
thus heralding in the field of neuropsychology and the traditional
case study approach to the cognitive and social neurosciences.12 Yet,
the fantastical accounts of Gage’s post-accident personality changes,
“too monstrous for belief,”13 are what captivated history and made
Gage famous.14 According to one familiar view, as a result of his
injury, Gage was “an unstable, impatient, foul-mouthed, work-shy
drunken wastrel, who drifted around circuses and fairgrounds,
unable to look after himself, and dying penniless in an institution.”15
Indeed, my survey of the last thirty-seven law review articles that
mentioned Gage consistently depicted him as “‘antisocial,’ ‘fitful,’
‘irreverent,’ ‘grossly profane,’ ‘garrulous,’ ‘sexually promiscuous,’
‘reckless,’ ‘unreliable’ and ‘irresponsible.’”16
This heinous and distorted biography of Gage was fueled in part
by the limited number of primary sources documenting Gage’s life,
coupled with his accident’s unlikelihood.17 Yet, just as important
were the experts involved in assessing Gage’s injuries (either directly or not) and reporting their opinions about them. For example,
over a century after the accident, a prominent neuroscientist controversially wrote a book based in part on his negative assumptions
about Gage’s injuries and behavior to help analyze his patients.18
We now know that many of the rumors about Gage—including the

cited articles from nineteenth-century neurology literature”); Arnold LeUnes, Contributions
to the History of Psychology: XX. A Review of Selected Aspects of Texts in Abnormal
Psychology, 35 PSYCH. REPS. 1319, 1322-26 (1974) (documenting the frequent citation of
Harlow’s 1868 article prior to 1950).
12. See Shelley, supra note 11, at 281.
13. MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 279 (citation omitted).
14. See, e.g., id. at 368-80.
15. Malcolm Macmillan & Matthew L. Lena, Rehabilitating Phineas Gage, 20
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REHAB. 641, 643 (2010) (providing an updated perspective on Gage
based on new information).
16. See Deborah W. Denno, Analysis of Law Review Articles Mentioning Phineas Gage
(July 30, 2021) (unpublished document) (on file with author).
17. See MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 279-337. The change in accounts about Gage came
with the publication of Malcolm Macmillan’s book. See Denno, supra note 16, at 3
(differentiating between materials on the subject written before and after 2000, the year
Macmillan published his book).
18. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 34-39 (1994).
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ones in that book—were false or undocumented.19 Australian
psychologist Malcolm Macmillan started to set the record straight
in 2000 in his stunningly comprehensive book and articles.20
According to Macmillan, Gage thrived in unexpected ways during
his short lifetime, despite his injuries.21
Why would I begin an Article on imagining the future of law and
neuroscience with a brain story nearly two centuries old that others
have addressed so many times? One expected answer, of course, is
that the past is typically a strong predictor of the future. And the
Gage case is a compelling crystal ball. For starters, almost immediately after his injury, Gage became a pawn in contentious debates
in science over how the brain works.22 Today, we recognize that
parts of the brain are specialized for particular purposes.23 But, in
the nineteenth century, other scientists held a more holistic
perspective,24 an approach based on the limits of brain science at the
time. How and to what extent there were reported changes in Gage’s
sociabilities would support one scientific view over the other and
thus influence the diverging narratives about Gage’s brain.25 These
kinds of scientific turf wars certainly exist today,26 and they will
likely become even more pronounced in the future.
In the context of the criminal justice system, for example, experts
continuously present testimony driving the narrative about criminal
defendants depending on whether they are hired by the prosecution
or defense.27 Deciding which story is most persuasive lies in the
19. See Denno, supra note 16, at 3. For a critique of Damasio’s account of Gage in the first
several chapters of DESCARTES’ ERROR and elsewhere, see Zbigniew Kotowicz, The Strange
Case of Phineas Gage, 20 HIST. HUM. SCIS. 115, 130 n.6 (2007) (“Damasio is the principal
perpetrator of the myth of Gage the psychopath .... Damasio changes [Harlow’s] narrative,
omits facts, and adds freely .... [H]is account of Gage’s last months ... is ... a grotesque
fabrication ... insinuating that Gage was some riff-raff who in his final days headed for
California to drink and brawl himself to death.”).
20. See, e.g., MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 279-337; Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at
642-43 (providing an updated perspective on Gage); Macmillian, supra note 10, at 182.
21. Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 642-43.
22. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
23. See Shelley, supra note 11, at 280.
24. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
25. See discussion infra Part I.B.
26. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their
Use of Neuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2016) (examining how the defense
and prosecution use neuroscientific evidence differently in their arguments in death penalty
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hands of the judge or jury.28 There are also striking parallels between how experts have portrayed Gage over nearly two centuries
and how experts in the legal community characterize defendants
with brain injuries today.29 While Gage was never charged or prosecuted for a crime (despite rumors suggesting otherwise), the case
remains a metaphor for misunderstandings about brain injured
individuals, inside and outside of the law.
The purpose of this Article is to explore how experts have
dominated the neuroscience narrative in U.S. criminal cases for
twelve decades, from 1900-2020. Stepping back and tracing trends
provides perspective on the future of law and neuroscience because
“[h]istory, in this sense, is all we have.”30 The discussion focuses on
insanity cases because most such cases involve brain damage or abnormality and thus rely heavily on neuroscientific evidence.31 In
addition, for the past 120 years, insanity tests and standards have
remained exceptionally stable relative to other criminal law doctrines.32 The criminal justice system’s heavy reliance on scientific
cases); Gary Edmond, Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the ‘Facts’ to Speak for
Themselves, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 555, 580-81 (1999) (emphasizing “that the role of scientists being
enrolled (or enrolling themselves) and assisting in the construction of cases, especially the
development of prosecution and plaintiff narratives, both in criminal and civil litigation, are
important to the construction and configuration of legal narratives”).
28. See Peter Brooks, “Inevitable Discovery”—Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMANS. 71, 71 (2003) (noting that narrative structure, or more plainly “stories,” is a
driving force within the courtroom).
29. Compare Denno, supra note 16, at 3 (citing descriptions of Gage as “antisocial,”
“garrulous,” and “reckless”), with Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword:
An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 531-43
(2015) (discussing how prosecutors use evidence of a defendant’s brain damage to suggest that
they will be a future danger to others and engage in violent acts), and Sean D. O’Brien &
Kathleen Wayland, Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to Counter
Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 753 (2015) (reporting data from the
Capital Jury Project emphasizing “the importance of narrative to the decision-maker’s ability
to understand and respond to mitigating evidence, especially when such evidence includes
psychiatric or cognitive impairments,” and also showing that “jurors have difficulty
assimilating mitigating mental health testimony because they distrust mental health experts
as ‘hired guns,’ and because the ‘antisocial’ or ‘psychopathic’ labels invoke the fictitious
popular-culture stereotypes of violent criminals,” and that “[a]s a result, life-or-death
decisions can be made based on damaging stereotypes and pervasive cultural myths
associated with criminal behavior and prejudicial psychiatric labels”); see also infra Part IV.
30. GADDIS, supra note 1, at 3.
31. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
32. See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that while states have long tweaked and experimented with the language of insanity
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or medical experts in insanity cases—irrespective of the type of
neuroscientific evidence introduced into court—has also been remarkably fixed.33 The following discussion contends that, despite
the increasing influx of neuroscientific evidence and its purported
greater objectivity into the criminal justice system, experts still
dominate the narrative of how that evidence, including a defendant’s insanity claim, is viewed. While experts are a necessary and
invaluable contribution to this process, they can also dangerously
distort a defendant’s psychological and medical identity; these
twists are especially pronounced when the evidence and insanity
constructs are ambiguous, as they inevitably are.34
To support these arguments, this Article reports the results of my
original Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study (The Study) examining
the criminal justice system’s use of the insanity defense in all criminal cases—totaling 8,358—involving neuroscientific evidence over
the past twelve decades, from 1900 to 2020. Neuroscience—defined
generally as “the branch of the life sciences that studies the brain
and nervous system”—opened a world of cognitive discovery that
often questions the efficacy of established legal doctrines and
mores.35 Given The Study’s vast range of data and scope, the timeline of 120 years provides a crucial past and present approach to
predict the future of neuroscience.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of the Gage case and its
accompanying inaccuracies, noting how early and later expert evaluations of Gage remained fixed and influential over the years despite scientific advances and discoveries about Gage’s life. The Gage
case also heralded the criminal justice system’s increasing reliance
provisions, four main insanity tests have evolved, all with shared philosophies and goals, and
that “with striking consistency, they all express the same underlying idea: A defendant who,
due to mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for his
actions cannot be found guilty of a crime”).
33. For an excellent discussion of this issue in an article published seventy years ago, see
Henry Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 961 (1950).
34. See Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of
Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5, 13-17 (1996).
35. See NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206 (Brent
Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 931 (2d ed. 2021)
(defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the nervous
system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”).
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on testifying experts, fueling the centrality of the courtroom’s “battle
of the experts,” especially in criminal insanity cases involving neuroscience experts. Part II reviews the origins and development of
this country’s major insanity tests, as well as The Study’s efforts to
identify the law and science behind insanity defense trends in the
context of fluctuating crime rates. By analyzing The Study’s data,
Part III examines the nature and extent of the plunging insanity
defense rates and the reasons for the decline, including the impact
of the 1982 John Hinckley Jr. verdict. The Part also explores The
Study’s successful post-Hinckley insanity cases and the limited
number of circumstances and characteristics in which courts found
a defendant insane.
Part IV investigates how The Study’s insanity defense narratives
use experts in neuroscience to both support and refute insanityrelated claims by employing more sophisticated information to develop a fuller picture of the defendant. While the defense hires
experts to help link defendants’ mental health problems to their
criminal behavior and offer a mitigating narrative for insanity, prosecutors have increasingly relied on accusations of defendant malingering to dispute these strategies. For example, The Study found
that malingering issues have increased eight-to-ten fold over the
past twelve decades, and expert support of malingering claims can
be very persuasive. This Article questions the fairness and utility of
the divisive power of experts in insanity cases over the past 120
years, noting the scientific vestiges of the Gage case. Imagining a
future of law and neuroscience would help bring a more informed
and consensus-oriented approach to criminal justice experts.
I. PHINEAS GAGE AND THE PUSH-AND-PULL OF EXPERTS
The case of Phineas Gage is a tale told by the original experts
who evaluated him and the different scientific disciplines that used
him to present their version of how the brain operates. If ever there
was a roadmap for depicting the impact of the narratives of various
specialists, the Gage case would be it, starting with his physicians.
For example, Gage was among the first thoroughly documented
brain injury cases “where the roles of the patient and the treating
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physician evolved” clinically over time.36 Yet, these roles gave
treating physicians enormous power in determining their patients’
behavioral narratives, especially if they assumed a particular
perspective, as Gage’s expert physicians did.37
A. Expert Physicians
John Harlow, Gage’s primary doctor, provided the most firsthand
documentation about Gage because Harlow treated him shortly
after the accident.38 Indeed, nearly all of the original information
about Gage derives from two short articles of Harlow’s published
twenty years apart in 1848 and 1868.39 According to Harlow’s
account, Gage had an impeccable reputation before his injury.40
Gage was “the most efficient and capable foreman in [his bosses’]
employ”41 a man of “temperate habits” and “considerable energy of
character” and physical strength—a “great favorite” with his coworkers.42
Those who knew Gage agreed that he possessed “a well-balanced
mind” and was “a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and
persistent in executing all his plans of operation.”43 Yet, these
perceptions switched abruptly after the accident.44 According to
Harlow’s interviews, Gage’s “mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaintances said he was ‘no longer
Gage.’”45 The injury substantially transformed Gage’s behavior and
36. Alan G. Lewandowski et al., Phineas Gage: A Neuropsychological Perspective of a
Historical Case Study, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ONLINE 31 (William B. Barr & Linas A.
Bieliauskas eds., 2020).
37. John F. Kihlstrom, Social Neuroscience: The Footprints of Phineas Gage, 28 SOC.
COGNITION 757, 768 (2010) (noting phrenological influences in Harlow’s 1848 and 1868
articles).
38. See Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 389-90. According to Harlow, Gage’s accident took
place at 4:30 PM on September 13, 1848, and Harlow did not arrive until 6:00 PM to examine
him. Id. Edward H. Williams, M.D., was the first doctor to see Gage, about thirty minutes
after Gage’s accident. See id. Thereafter, Harlow took over. Id.
39. See id.; Harlow 1868, supra note 4.
40. See Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 389-90.
41. Harlow 1868, supra note 4, at 339.
42. Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 389-90.
43. Harlow 1868, supra note 4, at 340.
44. See id.
45. Id.
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personality, seemingly for life.46 And so the tales and contradictions
about Gage started to evolve over the decades, bedeviled, it seems,
by warring factions within medicine and psychology that twisted
Gage’s life in whatever direction suited them.47
Harlow’s two depictions of Gage over twenty years—which
changed substantially—exemplify these conflicts.48 In Harlow’s first
report, published two months after Gage’s incident, he wrote of
Gage’s positive attributes, reputation, and “most heroic firmness” in
handling his injuries.49 Harlow also found that, within a month
post-injury, Gage’s “[i]ntellectual faculties [were] brightening” and
his “memory [was] as perfect as ever.”50 While he viewed Gage as
being “very childish” for wanting to go home to be with his family
and noted that Gage “[d]oes not estimate size or money accurately,”
all else in his five-page report described Gage and his health
positively.51 Nearly four months after Gage’s accident, in a brief
update of the case, Harlow noted that Gage was then home with his
family in Lebanon, New Hampshire, “walking about the house, and
riding out, improving both mentally and physically.”52
Yet, twenty years later—nearly a decade after Gage died—Harlow
published another article, downplaying some of his initial positive
assessments about Gage’s advances.53 In this 1868 piece, Harlow
emphasized instead Gage’s “very childish” and “obstinate” ways,
noting that Gage was “impatient of restraint” and resisting control
“by his friends” due to his wishes to go home to see his family or to
purchase items at a store.54 Seven months post-injury, Harlow
recounted that Gage’s “physical health [was] good” despite some
facial scarring and paralysis, vision loss in his left eye, and some
depression in his skull.55 Yet, Harlow noted that Gage’s behavior
46. See id.
47. See discussion infra Part I.B.
48. Compare Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 392, with Harlow 1868, supra note 4, at 340.
49. Harlow 1848, supra note 4, at 390.
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id.
52. See Medical Miscellany, 39 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 506, 507 (1849) (quoting from
“[a] note, dated Jan. 3d, [1849], from Dr. Harlow, of Cavendish, Vt., the medical attendant of
Mr. Gage”).
53. See Harlow 1868, supra note 4, at 339-40.
54. Id. at 337.
55. Id. at 339.
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and personality seemingly changed radically, and Gage could not
recoup his job or friends.56 As Harlow explained, “[t]he equilibrium
or balance, so to speak, between [Gage’s] intellectual faculties and
animal propensities, seems to have been destroyed.”57 Gage became
“fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity
(which was not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows,” and unable to make stable plans.58
Such regressions aside, Harlow’s accounts also revealed Gage’s
persistence in one facet: from minutes after his accident to the day
he died, Gage always wanted to work and work hard.59 In 1851, just
three years after the incident, Gage was employed in a livery stable
in New Hampshire for nearly eighteen months.60 After that, he was
hired by a man going to Chile to start a line of stagecoaches.61 In
Chile, Gage cared for horses and drove a six-horse coach for nearly
eight years when, in 1860, his health failed and he returned to San
Francisco, where his mother and sister then lived.62 Despite arriving
“in a feeble condition, having ... suffered much from hardship and
exposure” in Chile, Gage’s health improved.63 Again, Gage was keen
to work and soon took on farm labor and other manual jobs.64
Unfortunately, months later, Gage died unexpectedly from a series
of convulsions over two days.65 While there was no autopsy, Gage’s
mother gave Harlow her son’s skull and tamping iron, which Harlow
would be the first to study intensively before donating it to the
Museum of Harvard Medical School.66
Harlow’s 1868 article offers insights about why Gage survived his
original accident for over a decade. Gage’s strong “physique, will,
and capacity of endurance, could scarcely be excelled,” and the iron
tamping rod’s round and smooth shape eased its entry and exit

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 339-40.
See id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 341 (quoting from a letter written by Gage’s mother about Gage’s condition).
Id.
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
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points in a more resilient part of Gage’s brain.67 Yet, Harlow was not
the only one to examine Gage in such medical detail. In January
1850, Henry Bigelow, a professor of surgery at Harvard University,
invited Gage to visit Boston for several weeks to assess Gage’s condition.68 Bigelow yearned to provide proof of “so remarkable an injury” with a “complete record” including “the testimony of a number
of persons who were cognizant of the accident or its sequel.”69
Unfortunately, apart from compiling verbatim documentation that
the injury and brain loss occurred, Bigelow added little by way of
insight about Gage’s condition and nothing about Gage’s personality
or behavior.70 That said, the nature and extent of Gage’s brain loss
“without impairing its functions” led Bigelow to agree that Gage’s
case was unprecedented71—the verification the medical community
needed.
B. Competing Ideologies
Such a spotlight on Gage, in addition to the scant and inconsistent firsthand information about him, regrettably fueled the perception that his purported changes were permanent.72 Experts controlled his narrative and twisted his story.73 The circumstances also
spawned a tug of war among competing ideologies of the brain that
may have influenced Harlow’s change in viewpoints from his 1848
article to his 1868 article twenty years later.74 For example, the
Gage case has enabled “the fitting of almost any theory to the small
number of facts” available,75 thereby becoming a “Rorschach inkblot”
for conflicting views of the structure and function of the brain.76
67. Id. at 344.
68. Bigelow, supra note 6, at 13.
69. Id. These individuals included Joseph Adams, the owner of the hotel where Gage was
staying, id. at 14-15, the Rev. Joseph Freeman, who saw Gage shortly after the accident, id.
at 15, Edward H. Williams, M.D., the first physician to see Gage within a half-hour after the
accident, id. at 15-16, and John Harlow, M.D., id. at 17-19.
70. See id. at 14-15, 17, 22.
71. Id. at 22.
72. Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 641-42.
73. See, e.g., MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 309-13.
74. See, e.g., Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 647-49. Most notably, Harlow’s 1868
interpretations may have been influenced by his support for phrenology. See id. at 649.
75. MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 290.
76. METACOGNITION AND COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: MONITORING AND CONTROL
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These views ranged from cerebral localization to phrenology to the
somatic marker hypothesis, with some unsupported claims that the
Gage case spawned psychosurgery, especially frontal lobotomy.77
Even neurologist Oliver Sacks stressed “the interpretations and
misinterpretations [of Gage], from 1848 to the present,”78 while
psychologist Christian Jarrett emphasized how Gage has been used
to promote a widespread series of myths.79 Throughout “hundreds
of psychology and neuroscience textbooks, plays, films, poems, and
YouTube skits” is one premise: “Personality is located in the frontal
lobes, ... and once these are damaged, a person is changed forever.”80
Yet, Macmillian and Matthew Lena’s 2010 account of Gage’s life,
based on recently discovered records, suggests that Gage achieved
“a reasonably good social recovery” and adapted well to his traumatic brain injury.81 “Although ... Phineas may not have been the
Gage he once had been, he seems to have come much closer to being
so than is commonly believed.”82 For example, the authors point to
a recently discovered daguerreotype (photograph) of Gage, which
Gage seemingly arranged to have taken, that shows Gage as “selfassured” and with “surprisingly limited disfigurement.”83 Indeed,
the owners of the Gage daguerreotype stress that Gage “was a handsome man,” “well dressed and confident, even proud.”84 Likewise,
Macmillan and Lena detail Gage’s many accomplishments during
his post-accident years, especially the “complex skills,” “foresight,”
physical strength, and rigor expected of his stagecoach driving
PROCESSES 57-58 (Giuliana Mazzoni & Thomas O. Nelson eds., 1998).
77. See MACMILLAN, supra note 2, at 290 (discussing the range of conflicting theories
about the brain in interpreting Gage’s injuries, personality, and behavior); see also Macmillan,
supra note 10, at 182 (discussing the theories of David Ferrier and Sigmund Freud).
78. OLIVER SACKS, AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS: SEVEN PARADOXICAL TALES 59-61
(1995).
79. See Christian Jarrett, What the Textbooks Don’t Tell You About Psychology’s Most
Famous Case Study, BRIT. PSYCH. SOC’Y RSCH. DIG. (June 30, 2015), https://digest.bps.org.uk/
2015/06/30/what-the-textbooks-dont-tell-you-about-psychologys-most-famous-case-study/
[https://perma.cc/8WAH-KT8F].
80. CHRISTIAN JARRETT, GREAT MYTHS OF THE BRAIN 38 (2015).
81. See Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 642.
82. Id. at 655.
83. Id. at 644.
84. Jack Wilgus & Beverly Wilgus, Face to Face with Phineas Gage, 18 J. HIST.
NEUROSCIENCES 340, 343-44 (2009) (“One theory about Gage—that his personality might have
changed because his appearance was made grotesque by the accident ... no longer seems
credible to us.” (citation omitted)).
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position in Chile.85 In addition, Gage needed “to learn something of
the local language and customs.”86 Even a doctor who “knew Gage
well” in Chile stated that Gage enjoyed “good health, with no
impairment whatever of his mental faculties.”87
Importantly, Macmillan and Lena also correct misleading historical accounts about Gage. They provide a persuasive point-bypoint critique of Harlow’s negative and distorted perspectives on
Gage’s “child[ish]” and “obstinate” behaviors, interpreting them in
a more sensible, empathic, and positive context.88 Gage’s “obstinacy,” for example, “is consistent with a post-accident Phineas intent
on recovering as much of his pre-accident self as possible and with
a daily life structured by his work.”89 Thus, it appears that braininjured individuals put in highly structured environments can
regain some of their original functions and personalities.90
In the twenty-first century, Gage’s brain still fascinates, supporting a theory of brain specialization, just not in the way phrenologists had proposed. Indeed, in a 2012 study in PLOS One,
researchers created a 3-D model of Gage’s skull using modern
neuroimaging.91 According to the researchers, the model suggested
that the damage to Gage’s brain mainly occurred to Gage’s left
frontal lobe, an area associated with decision-making and emotional
processing, explaining some of Gage’s more subtle deficits and why
parts of his brain could regenerate.92
The purpose here is not to detail the neuropsychological aspects
of these findings—that is for another article to do—but rather to ask
why this modern comparison with earlier accounts about Gage is so

85. Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 645.
86. Id.
87. John Dawson & J. W. Hamilton, Editorial and Miscellaneous, 13 OHIO MED. & SURGICAL J. 171, 174 (1861).
88. Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 642.
89. Id. at 654.
90. Id. at 651-52.
91. See John Darrell Van Horn et al., Mapping Connectivity Damage in the Case of
Phineas Gage, PLOS ONE (May 16, 2012), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.13
71/journal.pone.0037454 [https://perma.cc/VRA6-KLUV].
92. Id.
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essential. While “the facts and mythology of [the Gage] case have
captured the imagination of generations of future neuropsychologists,”93 they have also hindered and dehumanized rehabilitation
efforts.94 The Gage case has shown that even severely brain-damaged individuals can defy the savage and stigmatizing stories about
them and live a full life, due to the brain’s resilience and adaptation
to purposeful and structured environments.95
This overview brings us back to the starting question: What does
the story of Phineas Gage have to do with the future of law and neuroscience? While Gage was an unprecedented brain-injury case, it
also revealed the extent to which an evolving clinical relationship
between patients and treating physicians96 could enable physicians
to create their patients’ behavioral narratives, as Harlow did in his
purported embrace of phrenology.97 The Gage case was also a harbinger of a growing movement in this country’s history when testifying experts in court began to take on a prominent position in a
“battle of the experts,” especially in criminal insanity cases involving neuroscience experts.98
The following Part provides a backdrop for this discussion,
starting first with an overview of major insanity defenses, then The
Study. This Article applies The Study’s results to question the
strong and consistent power of experts in insanity cases over the
past 120 years (starting soon after the Gage case), and to predict
where those experts will be in the twenty-second century. The
neuroscientific aspects of these cases have attracted little attention,
yet they have broad implications, not just for the insanity defense,
but also for the future of law and neuroscience.
93. Lewandowski et al., supra note 36, at 32.
94. See generally Macmillan & Lena, supra note 15, at 651-52 (detailing the long road
mental care professionals traversed—due to a lack of quality, unadulterated primary
sources—to craft a rehabilitation regimen that closely resembled Gage’s).
95. Id. A striking recent example of such recovery can be found in the case of Daniel Carr,
who lost a substantial part of his brain when he experienced a stroke as a newborn only to
find that his brain was able to remap itself. See Meeri Kim, A Newborn Lost Large Parts of
His Brain. Today, He’s an Athletic College Grad., WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2022, 9:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/perinatal-stroke/2022/01/21/7347c514-3903-11ec91dc-551d44733e2d_story.html [https://perma.cc/8UMH-E95L].
96. Lewandowski et al., supra note 36, at 31.
97. Kihlstrom, supra note 37, at 768 (noting phrenological influences in Harlow’s 1848 and
1868 articles).
98. See Weihofen, supra note 33, at 962.
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II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE ACROSS TWELVE DECADES
The insanity defense has long reflected “the fundamental moral
principles of our criminal law, resting on assumptions that are older
than the Republic and beliefs about human rationality, deterrability
and free will.”99 Despite the defense’s longstanding history and
significance, there is relatively little empirical research relating to
its application in criminal law.100 In addition, most of the existing
empirical work centers around a specific time frame and scope due
to various data-gathering constraints, incomplete records, and
methodological choices.101 This Part provides a brief overview of
major insanity tests and discusses the underpinnings of The Study.
As the discussion will show, insanity tests have remained stable
over the decades with minimal changes to their overall substance,
thus providing a firm foundation to examine the narrative impact
of experts.
A. Major Insanity Tests
Five main insanity tests evolved over the centuries with shared
philosophies and goals. “[W]ith striking consistency, they all express
the same underlying idea: A defendant who, due to mental illness,
lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for
his actions cannot be found guilty of a crime.”102 These tests are the
M’Naghten rule; the “irresistible impulse” test; the “Durham” or
“product” standard; the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
99. MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 14-1.1 (3d ed. 2021) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The first
insanity acquittal was recorded in 1505 in England. See NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY
IN ENGLAND 25-26 (1968).
100. See generally Richard A. Pasewark, A Review of Research on the Insanity Defense, 484
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 100, 101 (1986); Richard A. Pasewark & Hugh McGinley,
Insanity Plea: National Survey of Frequency and Success, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 101 (1985)
[hereinafter Pasewark I]; Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, National Survey of the
Frequency and Success of the Insanity Plea and Alternative Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205
(1989) [hereinafter Pasewark II]; Carmen Cirincione & Charles Jacobs, Identifying Insanity
Acquittals: Is It Any Easier?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487 (1999).
101. See Pasewark, supra note 100, at 101.
102. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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test; and the federal standard for insanity.103 Presently, forty-five
states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia have
an insanity defense.104 More than half (thirty states or 60 percent)
of all states have adopted the M’Naghten rule and its offspring
tests.105 In turn, another thirteen states and the District of Columbia use the Model Penal Code standard.106 New Hampshire alone
uses the “Durham” or “product” test, and North Dakota’s test is a
“unique formulation,” that considers “whether the defendant ‘lacks
substantial capacity to comprehend the harmful nature or consequences of the conduct, or the conduct is the result of a loss or serious distortion of the individual’s capacity to recognize reality.’”107
Five states have effectively eliminated the insanity defense.108
Of the five major insanity tests, the M’Naghten rule is the earliest and most famous, established in 1843 by the English House of
Lords in M’Naghten’s Case—five years before the Gage incident.109
The first part of the test concerns a defendant’s “cognitive [ ]capacity,” or whether the defendant was aware of their actions—a phrase

103. See infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
104. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a comprehensive breakdown
of the types and numbers of insanity tests across states, see id. app. at 1051-59. Several U.S.
territories also have an insanity defense, including the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Puerto
Rico, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 14(4)
(2021); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 7.16 (2021); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34A, App. II, Rule 74 (2021); AM.
SAMOA CODE ANN. § 46.1301 (2021); N. Mar. I. R. Crim. P. 12.2.
105. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-04.1-01(1) (2012)).
108. These five states “exonerate a mentally ill defendant only when he cannot understand
the nature of his actions and so cannot form the requisite mens rea.” Id. at 1026 n.3 (majority
opinion); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2021); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.010(a), 12.47.020
(2021); IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1), (3) (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2021); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-305 (LexisNexis 2021).
109. (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL). The English House of Lords presented the defense
as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, [1] as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, [2] if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong.
Id.
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that “corresponds roughly to the modern concept of mens rea for
many offenses.”110 The second part, “moral [ ]capacity,” inquires,
“even if the defendant knew what he was doing, did he have the
capacity to know that it was wrong?”111 Strikingly, the M’Naghten
two-part approach to insanity has been this country’s most widely
used test since its adoption.112
Critics have long condemned M’Naghten for its stringent language, limiting defendants’ efforts to prove their insanity.113 Likewise, the tests that followed M’Naghten were developed “to expand,
not contract, the scope of the insanity defense.”114 Some courts
broadened the M’Naghten test with an “irresistible-impulse” standard that recognized that the defendant’s lack of capacity could also
include a lack of control.115 Broader still was the “Durham” or “product” test introduced in 1954, developed to accommodate modern
psychiatric insights.116 However, Durham’s departure from standard
insanity jurisprudence was met with roadblocks; the only state to
adopt a version of it is New Hampshire.117
The most successful attempt to replace the M’Naghten standard
was the American Law Institute’s 1962 Model Penal Code test,
which substantially expanded both prongs of M’Naghten and
introduced a volitional impairment component.118 Under the Model
110. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep.
at 722.
111. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at
722.
112. See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at app. 1051-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 324, 329 (8th ed. 2018).
114. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1045 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (“The jury’s range
of inquiry will not be limited to, but may include, for example, whether an accused, who
suffered from a mental disease or defect did not know the difference between right and wrong,
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible impulse, or had been deprived of or lost the
power of his will.” (internal quotations omitted)), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“We are unanimous in our decision
today to abandon the formulation of criminal responsibility adopted eighteen years ago in
[Durham].... [J]uries will now be instructed in terms of the American Law Institute test.”).
117. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1045-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The U.S. Virgin Islands has as
well. See Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1978).
118. See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036 n.12; Deborah W. Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates? A Short
Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 11-17 (2003) (examining the
differences between M’Naghten and the Model Penal Code test).
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Penal Code’s test, individuals are not responsible for their criminal
conduct if, because of mental disease or defect, they either lacked
“substantial capacity” to appreciate the “criminality” (or, depending
on the state legislature, the “wrongfulness”) of their conduct, or they
failed to “conform” their conduct “to the requirements of law.”119 The
test, which quickly garnered support from legislatures and courts,
was adopted nearly unanimously by federal circuit courts and over
half of the states by the 1980s.120
The Model Penal Code’s popularity gained momentum until 1982,
when it suffered an enormous setback. On June 21 of that year, a
jury found John Hinckley Jr. not guilty by reason of insanity for his
attempted assassination a year earlier of then-President Ronald
Reagan, based on the Model Penal Code standard.121 Public furor
over Hinckley’s acquittal was swift and urgent: the federal government and some states eliminated the Model Penal Code’s volitional
component and introduced other restrictions, including a return to
a M’Naghten-type standard.122 Few states resorted to reframing or
effectively abolishing the insanity defense,123 yet the Hinckley
verdict shattered the Model Penal Code’s foothold.124 In 1984,
Congress enacted its version of the M’Naghten test—the “Federal
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST., Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985)
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE 1985]. The exact standard is as follows: “A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Id. (alteration in original).
120. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 99, § 14-1.2.5.
121. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley: A Brief History of the Insanity Defense,
PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/history.html [https://perma.
cc/QT5J-4SBR]. For excerpts from the trial transcript and a discussion of the events surrounding Hinckley’s attempted assassination, as well as further legal proceedings up to 2020, see
generally RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (4th ed. 2021). An overview of the facts of the case can also be found
in Hinckley v. United States, 163 F.3d 647, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). After Hinckley’s verdict,
he was committed to a federal institute for psychiatric care. See Spencer S. Hsu, Would-Be
Reagan Assassin John Hinckley Jr. Wins Unconditional Release, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2021,
3:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/john-hinckley-unconditional-re
lease/2021/09/27/8e5f5286-1f9f-11ec-9309-b743b79abc59_story.html [https://perma.cc/WG5LF9AV]. On September 27, 2021, a federal judge awarded Hinckley unconditional release beginning in June 2022. See id.
122. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY
DEFENSE REFORM 46-47 (1993).
123. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 44.
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test”—thus quashing the federal system’s near-unanimous adoption
of the Model Penal Code test.125 In line with this Article’s focus and
discussion of Gage, the battle of the experts was deemed crucial in
the Hinckley case.126 While this battle has been detailed elsewhere,
the turf wars among experts made clear that, irrespective of the
factual and doctrinal aspects of an insanity case, how particular
experts presented information was highly persuasive to the case’s
outcome. As this Article later demonstrates, this Hinckley effect also
seemingly contributed to a steep decline in this country’s use of the
insanity defense.127
Identifying other potential influences during this period, especially crime trends, helps put insanity tests into fuller perspective
and appreciate the narrative focus of insanity cases. Examining the
ebbs and flows of criminality over time also offers some view for the
future, given the effects of the pandemic and other societal and
cultural forces, in conjunction with expert testimony.
B. Crime Rate Trends
Crime rate trends provide, even generally, a context with which
to examine other types of trends in criminal justice systems. For
example, over the 120 years from 1900 to 2020, the insanity defense
showed a near-linear decline in use.128 In contrast, while crime rates
varied across this period, the rates generally increased from 1900
until they reached their highest peak in history in the early
1980s.129 Crime rates then dropped modestly until they spiked again
125. The “Federal test” states:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant,
as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does
not otherwise constitute a defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
126. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 121; STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 46-47.
127. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Figures 1-3.
129. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000 37 (2000). Much of the crime
rate data comes from the Uniform Crime Reporting program, which publishes annual crime
rate data. No single source addresses crime rates for all serious crimes during the 120-year
span (1900-2020) that this author reviewed. However, data from various sources was pulled
together to provide an overview of the crime rate trends during this expanse of time. See id.

2022]

NEUROSCIENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES

1237

to their second-highest levels in the early 1990s.130 Thereafter, crime
rates began a near-continuous decline leading up to 2019.131 Significant events such as the Great Depression and Vietnam War precipitated some of the more pronounced increases or decreases in
crime rates.132
A further examination of specific eras situates the crime rate
increase. For example, violent crime surged from 1900-1925 in the
wake of changing social and cultural forces.133 Murder rates, in
particular, continued to climb, and they peaked during the height
of the Great Depression in the early 1930s.134 Starting in the mid1930s, however, violent crime began to decline and ultimately
plateaued until the 1960s.135 From the 1960s up to the mid-1970s,
during the Vietnam War (which spanned from 1961-1975), violent
crime rates soared.136 Through the mid-1970s, the crime rate trends
continued their overall upward momentum, with rates fluctuating
at all-time highs from year to year.137 These rates peaked during the
early 1980s, followed by a modest decline, and peaked again during
the early 1990s.138
at 34 (surveying the United States index crimes—crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault—from 1933-1998 based on data collected from the Uniform Crime
Reporting program and homicide rates from 1900-1998, as well as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)); Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (Sept. 28, 2020), https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/
pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend [https://perma.cc/3GCV-N8NG] (showing crime rate trends
from 1986 to 2019 for violent crimes, including homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault); see also Jeffrey S. Adler, Less Crime, More Punishment: Violence, Race, and Criminal
Justice in Early Twentieth-Century America, 102 J. AM. HIST. 34, 36-42 (2015) (discussing
lethal and nonlethal crime rates from 1900 to 1940).
130. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 129, at 36-37.
131. See id. at 37; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 129.
132. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 129, at 38-39 (showing trends in murder rates in
relation to historical events).
133. See Adler, supra note 129, at 36 (“[T]he start of the twentieth century reflected ... a
surge in the proportion of young men in the population, an increase in racial conflict and
ethnic tensions, and shifts in gender roles.... Prohibition, organized crime, and bootlegging
contributed only modestly to the surge in lethal violence during the 1920s.”).
134. Id. at 36, 39-40; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 129, at 38.
135. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 129, at 36-39. Despite the overall trend towards
declining crime rates for index crimes, there was a brief increase in murder rates following
soon after the end of World War II in 1945 before the rates began declining again. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 129.
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Thus, after a nearly continuous incline in crime rates from the
1960s to the 1990s, crime rates started a virtually uninterrupted
decline.139 By the early 2010s, violent crime rates declined to levels
similar to those reported during the early 1970s.140 A slight increase
in crime occurred from 2014 to 2016 but has started to decrease
again through 2019, the last year of official crime reporting.141
There are time and data constraints to this analysis. At this
writing, detailed crime rates for 2020 are still being documented,
and 2021 and 2022 data are not yet available. That said, preliminary reports show that the COVID-19 pandemic influenced crime
rates through 2020 and is likely to continue to impact crime rates
through 2021 and beyond, much like other historic events.142
Preliminary reports of crime rates during 2020 also show that
homicides and domestic violence rates increased while robberies and
property crimes decreased.143 This spike in homicides was particularly pronounced in major cities throughout the United States.144
On the heels of the nearly continuous climb in crime rates in the
1960s, changing prosecutorial policies and aggressive punitive sentencing resulted in a rapidly growing prison population in the
1970s.145 Although crime rates declined from the mid-1990s through
2019, incarceration rates increased by 500 percent in the nearly
forty-year period between 1980 and 2019.146 Incarceration rates
139. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 129, at 36-39; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra
note 129.
140. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45236, RECENT VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1-5 (2018).
141. Id.; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 129. At the time this Article was being
written, the Uniform Crime Reporting program only released crime rate trends through 2019,
and this author only looked at crime rate trends up to this point. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
supra note 129.
142. See RICHARD ROSENFELD ET AL., PANDEMIC, SOCIAL UNREST, AND CRIME IN U.S. CITIES:
2020 YEAR-END UPDATE 6-8, 18-20 (2021), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/up
loads/Year_End_Crime_Update_Design.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ9X-FDJ3]; see also Spencer
Bokat-Lindell, Why Are So Many Americans Killing One Another?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/opinion/murder-rate-police-homicide.html [https://
perma.cc/HFP2-Q226].
143. ROSENFELD ET AL., supra note 142, at 6-14.
144. See id. at 6-7, 18-21.
145. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
146. See Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENT’G PROJECT (2020), https://www.sentencing
project.org/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/22VY-L5W6]; JED S. RAKOFF, WHY THE
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soared, climbing consistently from the 1970s until the rates peaked
in the late 2000s.147 After this peak, incarceration rates began a
modest decline during the early 2010s that has continued through
2019 and is likely to continue amidst pandemic concerns regarding
the prison population.148
To different degrees, all of these crime trend factors influence how
the criminal justice system operates. In imagining the future of law
and neuroscience, then, such forces would also be expected to affect
how that system will interpret and use neuroscientific evidence.
C. The Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study
Past empirical research has revealed foundational information
about the insanity defense.149 Yet, The Twelve-Decade Neuroscience
Study updates and expands critical substantive and methodological gaps in existing empirical data. The Study’s timeframe also
provides an idea of neuroscience and expert testimony going into
the future.
1. Goals
The primary purpose of The Study is broad-based: to examine all
criminal cases, totaling 8,358, that involved neuroscientific evidence
over the past twelve decades, from January 1, 1900, to December 31,
2020. This large-scale empirical research project offers an unprecedented opportunity to investigate how neuroscience meshes with the
legal system’s framework from multiple and diverse perspectives,
ranging from the evolving use of neuroimaging and expert testimony
INNOCENT PLEAD GUILTY AND THE GUILTY GO FREE AND OTHER PARADOXES OF OUR BROKEN
LEGAL SYSTEM 7 (2021).
147. See James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July
20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-massincarceration [https://perma.cc/B4BC-9ZEP]; Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 146.
148. See Cullen, supra note 147; Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 146. However, not
surprisingly, the data are complex and continuously shifting, with some projecting that some
noted drops are “temporary.” See Wendy Sawyer, New Data: The Changes in Prisons, Jails,
Probation, and Parole in the First Year of the Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 11,
2022), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2022/01/11/bjs_update/ [https://perma.cc/7E9G-BL
CG].
149. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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over time to the impact of childhood trauma.150 The Study also
considers how neuroscience can promote a safer, fairer, and more
efficient criminal justice system. Focusing on insanity cases only,
this Article’s specific goal is to analyze how experts present
neuroscientific evidence in this particular context. No matter the
type of neuroscientific evidence a case uses or the decade in which
that case occurred, experts are the key link in how the evidence is
explained to criminal justice actors. An overview of the role of
experts within insanity cases is especially insightful because the
insanity defense has existed in all states across The Study’s time
frame of 120 years.
2. Methodology
This Article’s methodology and coding processes are described in
detail in Appendix A.151 In general, The Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study’s cases were acquired employing the Westlaw and
Lexis databases. Searches were made for “criminal law” cases and,
within that group, additional searches for “neuroscientific evidence,” based on The Study’s operational definitions.152
In collecting The Study’s data, I defined “neuroscientific evidence”
as incorporating three broad groups of search terms: (1) “neuroimaging tests” (brain scans), which are generated by computer images of
a human brain—such as an MRI or CT scan; (2) “non-neuroimaging
tests,” which are tests administered by a medical professional to an
individual to assess how that person’s brain operates—such as the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) or the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS); and (3) terms associated with
“expert testimony.”153
In the early twentieth century, defense and prosecuting attorneys relied mostly on expert testimony,154 despite the start, as
early as 1925, of crude forms of brain imaging.155 Of course, such
150. See infra Figure 4; see also infra Appendix A.
151. Infra Appendix A.
152. Infra Appendix A.
153. See infra Appendix A; Statistical Appendix, at 265-354 (on file with author).
154. See infra Figure 4.
155. The earliest “brain imaging” case in the The Study’s data set is People v. Krauser. 146
N.E. 593, 596 (Ill. 1925) (noting that defense experts took “[r]adio pictures of [Krauser’s]
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testimony was not as sophisticated or detailed as in later decades.
Likewise, modern neuroimaging technology did not yet exist, and
non-neuroimaging testing was limited. Regardless, because expert
testimony still controls most modern-day neuroscientific evidence,
The Study can reliably draw twelve-decade comparisons. For example, even in cases using advanced neuroimaging technology, expert
testimony remains heavily influential, making the comparisons
between past and recent cases all the more telling for imagining the
future of law and neuroscience.
To ensure validity and reliability for examining all cases across
the twelve decades, The Study employed trained and experienced
Fordham Law School J.D. student research assistants. These assistants hand-coded and analyzed over 100 key factors relevant to
the criminal justice system. Then, they created a different, more
concentrated coding system to investigate insanity cases.156
Set criteria established whether a case would be included in The
Study: a court must have announced a disposition in a case where
a party either introduced or sought to introduce neuroscientific
evidence at any point in the proceeding, including the innocence-orguilt phase, penalty phase, post-conviction hearing, and evidentiary
hearing. Cases in which neuroscientific evidence was introduced
post-trial were added in The Study only if a court took action based
on that evidence. Such action could include granting an evidentiary hearing, finding ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s
failure to pursue the evidence, or finding prior court error for failure to admit the evidence. For example, The Study contains several
post-conviction cases, including a death row defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel.157
3. Drawbacks
There are notable drawbacks to relying on the Westlaw and Lexis
databases. These databases contain only published opinions and,
skull” that “show[ed] a thickening over the back of the occipital bone, encroaching somewhat
upon the space that should be occupied by the part of the brain known as the cerebellum”).
156. See infra Appendix A.
157. See, e.g., Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Fields, 800 P.2d 862
(Cal. 1990); Pratt v. Armenakis, 112 P.3d 371 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Crawford v. State, 218 So.
3d 1142 (Miss. 2016).
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therefore, exclude plea agreements and the substantial numbers of
cases that other insanity defense researchers gathered from state
criminal dockets, forensic directors, the media, or other sources.158
Likewise, searches for “criminal law” cases in both Westlaw and
Lexis are inexact because both databases miscode; for example,
searches consistently contain a certain percentage of civil law cases
that need to be removed.159 Researchers must carefully read each
case not only to hand-code it but also to make a decision to exclude
it if it is not a criminal case.
In addition, this Article excludes an unknown number of criminal
cases that do not fit within the (unusually broad) parameters of
neuroscientific evidence that this Article details.160 That said, this
selection strategy provides a universe of cases from two wellestablished legal databases that ensure relative consistency and
accountability across the 120 years The Study examines. Because
documentation is available for all the cases used to create the figures in this Article,161 the Study’s methodology enables anyone to
verify or replicate the search methods.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND NEUROSCIENCE
This Part examines the results of The Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study to gauge how insanity defenses—and the neuroscientific
158. See generally Mary Rumsey, A Guide to Fee-Based U.S. Legal Research Databases,
N.Y.U. L. GLOB. BLOG (Aug. 2005), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/US_Fee-Based_
Legal_Databases.html#_III._Major_Vendors [https://perma.cc/9YJE-U2RN] (listing the categories of sources provided by Westlaw and LexisNexis); see also GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 200 (4th ed. 2018) (citing studies indicating that, on average, over
75 percent of insanity verdicts result from a plea or bench determinations).
159. See generally Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. S187, S197-98 nn.4-5 (2015) (attributing some disparities in research findings
to miscoding by legal databases).
160. Because the potential universe of cases that reference criminal law is almost infinite,
cases that involve everything from neuroimaging to medical professionals to expert testimony
give us a reasonable proxy for the cases in which the nature of insanity itself is most at issue.
Likewise, relative to other such studies, both national and international, The Study’s definition of neuroscientific evidence is exceptionally broad and inclusive. See Deborah W. Denno,
Empirical Use of Neuroscientific Evidence in Criminal Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 719-30 (2d ed. 2021) (comparing and contrasting the methodological
details of seven systematic and empirical studies).
161. See Statistical Appendix (on file with author); infra Figures 1-7.
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evidence on which these defenses rely—are used now and how they
may be employed in the future. Expectedly, most of The Study’s
cases involve defendants convicted of murder or other types of violent crimes, and nearly two-thirds began as capital cases.162
A. Insanity Defense Rates
Figure 1 provides some of The Study’s foundational information.163 Not surprisingly, based on this Article’s crime rate analysis,164 Figure 1 shows a general increase in the number of criminal
law cases—totaling 8,358—that involve neuroscientific evidence
over the decades.165 That growth is nearly linear, as crime rates are,
with a pronounced increase in 1980, when crime rates throughout
the country soared.166 Predictably, given the decline in crime rates
during the 1990s and 2000s, the number of cases involving neuroscience took a comparable downswing.167 That said, neuroscience
cases increased in the last decade (2010-2020),168 seemingly because
the criminal justice system is becoming more receptive to such
evidence.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See Statistical Appendix, at 367-774 (on file with author).
See infra Figure 1.
See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
Infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Number of Criminal Law Cases Involving
Neuroscientific Evidence per Decade from 1900-2020: 8,358 Total

The next question, considered in Figure 2, is whether insanity
defense cases followed the same kind of trajectory as Figure 1.169
The Study defines insanity defense cases as any case in which (1) a
defendant asserted or intended to assert an insanity defense, (2) a
defendant argued that an insanity defense should have been raised,
or (3) a court discussed an insanity issue of some kind.

169. See infra Figure 2.
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First, there are predictable parallels between the distributions in
Figures 1 and 2 in part because the insanity cases—which total
3,300170—were drawn from the pool of Figure 1’s 8,358 criminal law
neuroscience cases.171 Altogether, over the decades, over one-third
(39.48 percent) of the total pool of criminal law neuroscience cases
contained insanity cases (a ratio of 3,300 over 8,358).172 This total
percentage of insanity cases is significantly higher than what other
studies have demonstrated173 for two reasons: (1) the insanity defense was raised with far greater frequency in the earlier decades,174
a period that no study has examined empirically,175 and (2) the criminal cases in Figure 1 were selected according to whether they
involved some kind of neuroscientific evidence.176 In general, Figure
2 shows that the cases involving an insanity defense rose steadily
over the decades until the 1980s, after which the number of cases
quickly declined.177

170. See Statistical Appendix, at 1-264 (on file with author).
171. See id. at 186-259.
172. Compare supra Figure 1, with infra Figure 2.
173. See generally Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity
Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 331, 331-32 (1991);
Pasewark I, supra note 100; Pasewark II, supra note 100; Cirincione & Jacobs, supra note
100.
174. See infra Figure 3.
175. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
176. See supra Figure 1.
177. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Number of Insanity Defense Cases per Decade from
1900-2020: 3,300 Total Cases178

Figure 3 reveals the nature and extent of this decline among insanity defense cases179 by presenting percentages rather than raw
numbers—specifically, the number of insanity defense cases per
the number of criminal law cases involving neuroscientific evidence
per decade, from 1900-2020.180 In other words, Figure 3 shows the
decade-by-decade ratio of the number in Figure 2 over the number
178. Figure 2’s insanity defense cases were drawn from the pool of 8,358 cases in Figure
1. See Statistical Appendix, at 191-264 (on file with author).
179. See infra Figure 3.
180. See infra Figure 3.
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in Figure 1.181 The results in Figure 3 are striking. In the first
decade of the twentieth century (from 1900-1910), insanity defense
cases constituted the vast majority—93 percent—of all cases that
concerned neuroscientific evidence.182 From that first decade, Figure 3 shows a near-linear decline in insanity defense cases across
every decade, down to 10 percent of all cases in the 2010-2020
decade.183
Figure 3. Percentage of Insanity Defense Cases per Decade from
1900-2020: 3,300 Total Cases184

181. Compare supra Figure 1, and supra Figure 2, with infra Figure 3.
182. See infra Figure 3.
183. See infra Figure 3.
184. Figure 3 is a ratio of 3,300 cases over 8,358 cases (that is, the number of cases in
Figure 2 over the number in Figure 1).
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1. Reasons for the Plummeting Rates
There are seemingly two transparent reasons for the declining
rates in the insanity defense. First, the rapid drop between the
1980s and 1990s can be most readily attributable to the impact of
the Hinckley verdict and the institution of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984. The bulk of empirical research and legislative
changes on the insanity defense that this Article reviewed supports
this interpretation.185 Kansas was the last of five states to “reframe”
or “effectively abolish” the insanity defense due to Hinckley (in
1995); yet, the other four states did so within either a few months
or a few years from the verdict (Montana in 1979, Alaska and Idaho
in 1982, and Utah in 1983).186 While no other state has effectively
eliminated the insanity defense after Kansas, Figure 3 suggests this
Hinckley effect may have continued across the next three decades,
from 1990-2020.
A second and related reason for the decreasing insanity defense
rates pertains to the massive negative public opinion about the insanity defense, which the Hinckley verdict fueled all the more. For
example, some states switched to narrower insanity standards as
general beliefs about the insanity defense became increasingly
hostile.187 Indeed, even before Hinckley, multiple surveys of individuals—ranging from politicians, community members, college students, and professionals of all types (from police officers to state
hospital aids)—showed that the great majority of respondents believed that the insanity defense enabled defendants to escape responsibility for their crimes.188 This perspective also affected
Montana’s decision to discard the defense in 1979.189 By the time the
Hinckley verdict was handed down, these negative beliefs were held

185. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
187. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 121, at 133, 139-153; Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied:
Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 255-57 (1998).
188. See Rosen, supra note 187, at 255-56.
189. For a discussion of why Montana abolished the insanity defense pre-Hinckley, see
Jeanne Matthews Bender, Comment, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity Defense
in Montana, 45 MONT. L. REV. 133, 137 (1984) (“The abolition of mental disease or defect as
an affirmative defense was not triggered by a particular incident, but was apparently an
attempt to curtail the role of the mental health professional in criminal trials.”).
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by 90 percent of some of those surveyed.190 Thus, the 1980s brought
a perfect storm of factors battering the insanity defense: a longsurging crime rate, anti-insanity defense sentiment among the
public, and the 1982 Hinckley verdict.
There are at least two additional developments during the 1980s
and beyond that seemingly contributed to the plummeting insanity defense rates: (1) attorneys in later decades started to use neuroscience in more tailored ways than just the insanity defense, and
(2) courts showed an increased willingness to grant and accept neuroscientific expert testimony for matters other than insanity defenses. Whether these two developments are a cause or result of the
decreasing use of insanity defenses is an open question, although
they suggest the possibility of a complex causal dynamic.
With respect to attorneys’ more tailored uses of neuroscience, as
the decades progressed, defense lawyers started to apply neuroscience to legal doctrines beyond just the insanity defense. Figure 1’s
demonstration of the growth of neuroscientific evidence into the
courtroom reflects an increasing sophistication and knowledge of
the brain and behavior throughout the decades and a comparable
expansion of the mental health sciences.191 Both World Wars I and
II, for example, substantially advanced the medical sciences about
the causes and consequences of brain trauma.192 In turn, the 1980s
heralded the advent of neuroimaging, even prompting Hinckley’s
defense experts to introduce CT scan results into his trial to bolster their arguments that he suffered from brain abnormalities.193
In sum, expanding neuroimaging and non-neuroimaging tests
supported a wide range of mental health defenses and mitigation
evidence, not just a catch-all insanity defense.

190. See Rosen, supra note 187, at 255-56.
191. For analyses of the growth and increasing sophistication of neuroscientific evidence
(including imaging and non-neuroimaging tests) in empirical research studies over time, see
generally Darby Aono et al., Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review, 4 COGNITIVE RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2019); Denno, supra note 160.
192. For discussions of the social, cultural, and scientific forces behind the development of
the brain and behavioral sciences, see Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science
and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Consciousness];
Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601 [hereinafter Denno, Post-Freudian World].
193. Virginia Hughes, Head Case, 464 NATURE 340, 341 (2010).
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Likewise, the 1990s and onward showed neuroscience’s vast and
various applications in the legal system. For example, now attorneys could incorporate neuroscience to demonstrate a defendant’s
incapability to form specific intent or, in cases of homicide, a defendant’s extreme mental and emotional disturbance.194 Neuroscientific
evidence has been a particularly effective tool for supporting mitigation in the penalty phase of a death penalty case and helping to
construct a compelling story of a defendant’s life.195
These narratives detail the defendant’s life events that either
the prosecution or defense can use to illuminate the defendant’s
mental state, capacity, or behavior at the time of the crime. While
there were more insanity cases in the 1960s and earlier decades, the
courts used fewer words (and less neuroscience) to describe them
relative to the later decades.196 Seemingly, the influx of neuroscience
has helped the legal system get closer to “the person.”197 It also appears that courts have been more willing to accept neuroscientific
expert (and even lay) testimony regarding a defendant’s mental
capacity.198 These efforts broadly mirror three interrelated trends:
the rapid evolution of neuroscientific discoveries and techniques,
society’s enhanced understanding of the human brain and behavior,
and the growing destigmatization of individuals’ mental health
challenges over the past half-century.199
194. For an overview of these applications see generally Denno, Conciousness, supra note
192, at 323 (extreme mental and emotional disturbance); Denno, Post-Freudian World, supra
note 192, at 655-683 (negating specific intent and conscious will). Other types of applications
can be found in a range of different strategies using the cases in the 1992-2012 decades of
The Study. See generally, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Neuroscience and the Personalization of
Criminal Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 381-91 (2019) [hereinafter Denno, Personalization]
(analyzing cases relying on neuroscientific evidence in the context of self defense, diminished
capacity, incompetency, reduced mens rea, and standards of reasonableness); Deborah W.
Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323 (2017) (examining cases relying on
brain imaging in the context of prosecutors attempting to prove intent in the context of
Shaken Baby Syndrome); Denno, supra note 27 (negating or establishing mens rea).
195. For a discussion of neuroscientific evidence as mitigation in a death penalty case, see
Denno, supra note 29.
196. See Statistical Appendix at 17-27 (on file with author).
197. See generally Denno, Personalization, supra note 194 (showing how neuroscientific
evidence can effectively humanize defendants).
198. See supra Figure 1; Denno, supra note 29 (discussing courts’ greater openness to
admitting neuroscientific evidence).
199. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Psych. Ass’n, Survey: Americans Becoming More Open
About Mental Health (May 2019), https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/apa-mental-
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In essence, all criminal justice actors, including juries, have
multiple opportunities to understand neuroscientific evidence at a
level of depth and detail that was not possible in previous decades.
Consequently, experts can better explain to a jury certain brainbased defenses, such as diminished capacity, that may also be easier
to prove than the insanity defense.
2. Dominance of Expert Testimony
The Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study categorized and defined
neuroscientic evidence in three different ways: (1) expert testimony;
(2) non-neuroimaging evidence; and (3) neuroimaging evidence.200
This Subsection examines in Figures 4-6 the distribution of these
three categories in The Study’s 3,300 insanity cases generally to
better understand their role and potential significance.201 After all,
much of the controversy concerning neuroscientific evidence in the
courtroom focuses on neuroimaging tests, such as the MRI and CT
scans, to the exclusion of non-neuroimaging tests and expert testimony.202 Figures 4-6 suggest that emphasis is misplaced.
Strikingly, expert testimony dominates over non-neuroimaging
evidence and even more so over neuroimaging evidence. As Figure
4 shows, expert testimony is present in nearly all insanity cases (97
percent or 3,213 cases) between 1900 and 2020.203 While such testimony peaks to 99 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, after the 1910s
it never falls below 94 percent.204 Yet, while the defense and prosecution rely predominantly on expert evaluations and observations
during insanity trials, experts in turn are not relying on nonneuroimaging or neuroimaging tests as much as one would expect.
As Figures 5 and 6 show, non-neuroimaging tests were presented
in only 532 (16 percent) of the 3,300 insanity cases from 1900-2020,
health-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YRG-9VMS] (“A total of 87% of American adults agreed
that having a mental health disorder is nothing to be ashamed of, and 86% said they believe
that people with mental health disorders can get better.”).
200. Infra Appendix A.
201. See infra Figures 4-6.
202. As my overview of other empirical research shows, most research does not distinguish
neuroimaging data from non-neuroimaging data or from expert testimony. See generally
Denno, supra note 160, at 719-30.
203. See Statistical Appendix, at 265-77 (on file with author).
204. See infra Figure 4; Statistical Appendix, at 265-77 (on file with author).
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and neuroimaging tests were presented even less—in only 200 (6
percent) of the cases.205 The limited use of neuroimaging and nonneuroimaging testing in the early part of the twentieth century is
understandable given the lack of technology and training at that
point in history.206 For example, non-neuroimaging testing rose to
42 percent in the 2000s and is still presented in over one-quarter of
all cases in the 2010s.207 Yet, somewhat surprisingly, such an increase does not appear for the use of neuroimaging; it grew to its
height of only 12.5 percent in the last three decades.208 Likewise,
while neuroimaging plateaued at 12.5 percent in these latter decades (appearing in only sixty-nine (12.5 percent) of the 550 insanity
cases between 1990 and 2020),209 non-neuroimaging testing was
used over twice as much (appearing in 174 cases (31.6 percent) of
the 550 insanity cases between 1990 and 2020).210

205. See infra Figures 5-6.
206. See, e.g., Felix Schirmann, “The Wondrous Eyes of New Technology”—A History of the
Early Electroencephalography (EEG) of Psychopathy, Delinquency, and Immorality, 8
FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1-2 (2014).
207. See infra Figure 5.
208. See infra Figure 5.
209. See infra Figure 6.
210. See Statistical Appendix, at 352-54 (on file with author).
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Figure 4. Percentage of Insanity Defense Cases in Which Expert
Testimony Was Presented from 1900-2020: 3,300 Total Cases211

211. Figure 4 identifies the percentage of insanity defense cases in which expert testimony
was used to either support or refute an insanity defense. The breakdown per decade is as
follows: 1900s-93 cases, 1910s-81 cases, 1920s-120 cases, 1930s-130 cases, 1940s-153 cases,
1950s-285 cases, 1960s-441 cases, 1970s-549 cases, 1980s-839 cases, 1990s-217 cases, 2000s138 cases, 2010s-167 cases.

1254

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1215

Figure 5. Percentage of Insanity Defense Cases in Which NonNeuroimaging Evidence Was Presented from 1900-2020: 3,300
Total Cases212

212. Figure 5 identifies the percentage of insanity defense in which non-imaging evidence
was used to either support or refute an insanity defense. The breakdown per decade is as
follows: 1900s-0 cases, 1910s-3 cases, 1920s-9 cases, 1930s-6 cases, 1940s-15 cases, 1950s-52
cases, 1960s-28 cases, 1970s-110 cases, 1980s-131 cases, 1990s-69 cases, 2000s-61 cases,
2010s-48 cases.
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Figure 6. Percentage of Insanity Defense Cases in Which
Neuroimaging Evidence Was Presented from 1900-2020: 3,300
Total Cases213

For all twelve decades, attorneys overwhelmingly relied on expert testimony as compared to non-neuroimaging and neuroimaging tests. While the categories in Figures 4-6 are not mutually
exclusive in terms of the types of neuroscientific evidence presented
(there can be overlap), the substantial role of experts is clear.214 In
imagining the future of law and neuroscience, experts are likely to
213. Figure 6 identifies the percentage of insanity defense in which brain imaging evidence was used to either support or refute an insanity defense. The breakdown per decade is
as follows: 1900s-0 cases, 1910s-0 cases, 1920s-1 case, 1930s-1 case, 1940s-2 cases, 1950s-18
cases, 1960s-32 cases, 1970s-47 cases, 1980s-30 cases, 1990s-28 cases, 2000s-17 cases, 2010s22 cases.
214. See Statistical Appendix, at 265-336 (on file with author).
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maintain their dominance, regardless of the growing availability of
an even wider array of neuroscientific techniques.215 Similarly, legal
narratives framing neuroscience are bound to become even more
significant.216 While there may be no ready end to these neuroscientific stories, a legal system must prepare to accommodate
them.
B. Successful Insanity-Related Claims
The results of Figures 4-6 from the Twelve-Decade Neuroscience
Study suggest that the last three decades (1990-2020) of The Study’s
550 insanity cases warrant closer analysis, especially in an Article
about the future of law and neuroscience. Likewise, these postHinckley decades of insanity cases have remained mostly unexamined by other researchers, despite a general awareness of a postHinckley effect and The Study’s seeming documentation of it in
Figures 1-3.
Yet, investigating the parameters of the insanity defense across
The Study’s 1990-2020 cases prompts a critical question: What
factors make for a successful insanity case? This Article defines a
“successful case” as one in which the court ruled in favor of the defendant concerning an insanity defense-related claim. Of the 550
insanity cases that were raised from 1990-2020, courts found in
favor of defendants in eighty-six (15.64 percent) of those cases.217
While the reasons for the success of these cases varied, including
court error, this Section focuses on cases in which courts made an
actual finding of insanity—what this Section calls “pure” insanity
cases. A finding of actual insanity occurred in twenty-three cases
(26.74 percent).218 Specifically, of the eighty-six cases where the
court reversed the defendant’s conviction, it found the defendant
insane in only twenty-three of those cases. In the remaining sixtythree cases, the court did not determine that the defendant was

215. JONES ET AL., supra note 35, at 785-884 (discussing a range of future technologies and
aids, ranging from “cognitive enhancement” to “brain-machine interface and law,” to “artificial intelligence, robots, and law”).
216. See Aono et al., supra note 191, at 2-5.
217. See Statistical Appendix, at 363-65 (on file with author).
218. See id. at 365.
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insane and reversed on other grounds related to the defendant’s
insanity defense.219
Examining the nature and composition of these twenty-three
“pure” successful insanity defense cases can reveal more cleanly the
role of neuroscientific evidence and expert testimony unencumbered
by other procedural or error-related arguments. As would be expected, these cases also share similar features important for forecasting
the future.
C. Pure Successful Insanity Cases
An overview of the twenty-three pure successful insanity cases
suggests that the defendants who are most likely to be found not
guilty by reason of insanity have the following characteristics: (1) a
chronic and severe mental illness that causes delusions and that is
diagnosed by a qualified medical expert; (2) a well-documented and
well-supported history of that mental illness; (3) uncontradicted evidence of that mental illness; and (4) proof that, if intoxication was
involved in the defendant’s crime, it was not the only reason for the
defendant’s behavior.
Attorneys used experts to support, refute, or determine a defendant’s sanity in all twenty-three cases (100 percent). This outcome
suggests that, for the most part, a defendant cannot be found not
guilty by reason of insanity without assistance from at least one
expert. Not surprisingly, in light of Figures 4-6,220 experts rarely
relied on neuroimaging tests to bolster an insanity defense claim,
introducing scans in only two of the twenty-three cases (9 percent).221 In turn, non-neuroimaging tests, which were administered
in about one-third of the cases, were not always necessary to
diagnose a defendant with mental illness or produce a finding of
insanity.222 That said, non-neuroimaging tests commonly played a
substantial role in an expert’s narrative.223
219. See id. at 363-65.
220. See infra Figures 4-6.
221. See Statistical Appendix, at 366 (on file with author); see, e.g., Dixon v. State, 668 So.
2d 65, 67-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); People v. Chavez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 194-95 (Ct. App.
2008).
222. See Statistical Appendix, at 366 (on file with author); see also, e.g., infra note 227.
223. See Statistical Appendix, at 366 (on file with author).
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D. The Role of Non-Neuroimaging Tests
Courts look at evidence of insanity as a whole. Therefore, the testimony of an expert who did not administer psychological testing to
a defendant but conducted an extensive review of the defendant’s
psychological history, interviewed family members and other lay
witnesses, and spent a reasonable amount of time interviewing and
observing the defendant, may be found to be more credible than an
expert who only administered psychological testing and produced no
other evidence.224 In some cases, testing may not be appropriate or
yield clear or useful results.225 But, in other circumstances, nonneuroimaging results can be a substantial part of the narrative as
they were in the Phineas Gage case.226
In eight (35 percent) of the twenty-three successful insanity
cases, the defendants underwent non-neuroimaging testing.227 In
some of these cases, the tests were merely mentioned and the actual
results not discussed.228 In other cases, the opinion provided more
detail concerning how the non-neuroimaging testing contributed to
the defendant’s diagnosis. For example, in State v. Jackson, experts
administered to the defendant the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Benton Visual Retention Test, and other psychological tests.229 These tests validated a finding of severe mental
illness, diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia and organic delusional
disorder,230 and experts supported an insanity defense.231 Because
the experts’ assessments stemmed from “recognized psychological

224. See id. at 365-66; see also supra note 197.
225. See Statistical Appendix at 365-66 (on file with author); see also supra note 194.
226. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
227. See Bentley v. State, 904 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Dixon v. State, 668 So. 2d
65, 67-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); King v. People, No. CR-2015-0113, 2017 WL 3600548 (V.I.
Aug. 21, 2017); People v. Chavez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 194-95 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Armstrong, 671 So. 2d 307 (La. 1996); State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1994); United
States v. Aleksov, 910 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Murdoch, 98 F.3d 472
(9th Cir. 1996).
228. See Dixon, 668 So. 2d at 67-68 (stating that, although results were not discussed,
psychological tests performed on defendant appeared to support a finding that defendant
suffered from a delusional disorder).
229. 890 S.W.2d at 439.
230. Id. at 439-41.
231. Id. at 441.
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tests,” the court was swayed to render the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity.232
In United States v. Aleksov, experts used non-neuroimaging tests
to assess whether the defendant, who was previously found to be
insane after threatening to kill the President and confined to a mental institution, was at risk of committing violent acts if released
from confinement.233 Two experts administered the “Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide, or VRAG, an actuarial measure of the risk of
future violence,” which indicated “that [the defendant] ha[d] a
moderately low statistical risk of reoffending: 17% likelihood of recidivism after 17 years.”234 The experts also administered “the Historical, Clinical, Risk Management-20 (‘HCR-20’), which includes
twenty variables empirically validated for association with a risk of
violence,” that showed “the Defendant present[ed] a moderate risk
of engaging in any violence, and a high risk for engaging in behavior
similar to the offense that led to his arrest in this case, including
returning to the White House.”235
To determine if Aleksov still suffered the symptoms of his mental illness, experts also administered the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).236 The results showed that the
defendant “was extremely elevated on the scale for persecutory
ideas, which ... suggested potential social isolation and mood lability, meaning a tendency to overreact to minor stressors or perceived
insults.”237 According to the MMPI-2, Aleksov “was vulnerable to
real or imagined threats, which could result in dangerous behavior.”238
232. Id.
233. 910 F. Supp. 2d 230, 230, 236-37 (D.D.C. 2012).
234. Id. at 236-37.
235. Id. at 237.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
238. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The defendant exhibited a history of violent
behavior, three incidents of which led to his arrest and conviction:
First, in December 2007, the Defendant traveled to the White House and got
into a scuffle with Secret Service agents. The Defendant was arrested for assaulting an officer, resisting arrest, and interfering with a police officer....
Second, the Defendant was arrested for the offense at issue in this case—
threatening the life of then-President George W. Bush. On January 28, 2008, the
Defendant walked from his sister’s apartment in Alexandria, Virginia to the
White House. The Defendant went up to a secret service agent and stated that
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Despite these results, Aleksov argued for his release from the
institution to which he was confined and proposed a conditional
release plan that included transitioning to a community residential
facility and familial supervision.239 In order to qualify for release, a
defendant “must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
he does not pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person.”240 Perhaps not surprisingly, the court found that, based on
Aleksov’s record, including the results of various non-neuroimaging
tests, Aleksov “failed to satisfy his burden of proof” and “remain[ed]
actively psychotic and delusional.”241
In essence, courts rely on non-neuroimaging tests for medical and
legal purposes; yet, these tests also add to the narrative of how
defendants are perceived and presented, especially by experts. For
example, non-neuroimaging testing can be a vehicle for including
seemingly more objective testimony into the narrative, even for
more controversial and troublesome tests such as risk assessments.
These results suggest that the more effective and accurate way for
experts to use non-neuroimaging testing is to include it in their testimony based on other kinds of factors, such as the defendant’s
medical history, in-person evaluations, et cetera.
While such testing is presumably more objective than expert
analysis based purely on opinion, the interpretation of the test
results enters the realm of subjectivity. To combat this subjectivity,
experts should, as in Jackson, corroborate their assessments with
other external types of evidence, such as medical records, evaluations by other experts, in-person interviews, observations over time,
et cetera. This multi-evidence approach creates a more detailed and
comprehensive narrative aided by neuroscientific evidence.

he wanted to kill the President. The Defendant indicated that Satan had “hypnotized,” “instructed,” and “commanded,” him to go to the White House and kill
the President.... Third, in February 2008, an urgent care doctor at the D.C. Jail
treated the Defendant apparently after an altercation with officers at the Jail.
Id. at 237-38 (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 238-39.
240. Id. at 240.
241. Id. at 241.
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IV. HOW INSANITY DEFENSE NARRATIVES USE
NEUROSCIENCE EXPERTS
Expert neuroscience testimony is an integral part of criminal
court procedure. For centuries, professional experts have assumed
an important role in evaluating defendants and presenting mental
health findings.242 Neuroscience testimony has been especially significant in insanity cases because the defense relies on experts for
its success.243 By the time of the renowned M’Naghten case in 1843,
neuroscience testimony was a common addition in the courtroom.244
A. The Defense’s Narrative
While expert testimony can be vital for a defendant’s case, even
in the 1800s it had its fair share of challenges. In 1858, the United
States Supreme Court commented that “[e]xperience has shown that
opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any amount.”245 Similarly, a California court stated in
1870 that “these witnesses are generally but adroit advocates of the
theory upon which the party calling them relies, rather than
impartial experts, upon whose superior judgment and learning the
jury can safely rely.”246 Even today, “the prosecution and defense
choose the expert most appropriate for supporting their respective
legal strategies, which runs the risk of confirmation bias.”247
Despite the challenges that exist when choosing experts, their
inclusion helps shape an informed narrative that connects the
242. Winfred Overholser, Psychiatric Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Since
McNaughton—A Review, 42 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 283, 284 (1951) (stating
that medical testimony played a role in criminal proceedings as early as the trial of Earl
Ferrers in 1760).
243. See, e.g., People v. Gilberg, 240 P. 1000, 1003 (Cal. 1925) (affirming the lower court’s
decision to preclude the jury from considering a claim of insanity absent sufficient expert
evidence).
244. See Overholser, supra note 242, at 284.
245. Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858).
246. See Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water Works Co., 40 Cal. 396, 405 (1870).
247. Amitha Kalaichandran, We Must Rethink the Role of Medical Expert Witnesses, SCI.
AM. (May 5, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-must-rethink-the-role-ofmedical-expert-witnesses/ [https://perma.cc/M6BW-F62F]; see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text (detailing depictions of the battle of the experts).
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defendant’s mental health problems to their criminal behavior. In
the context of childhood trauma, for example, my prior research
analyzing two decades of neuroscientific evidence has shown that
courts are most swayed toward mitigation when defense attorneys
can link evidence of the defendant’s childhood trauma to their
criminality. Experts are vital to making that link.248
This Section presents the narratives of five of The Twelve-Decade
Neuroscience Study’s pure successful insanity cases to better understand how courts, attorneys, and experts create a defendant’s
insanity story. In most of these cases, the victims are highly sympathetic (for example, police officers, clergy, or children), and the
defendants’ acts inconceivably violent—factors that make an insanity defense acquittal all the more difficult. Yet, the cases also
share the four characteristics described previously that appear to
contribute strongly to a successful insanity defense claim: (1) a
severe mental illness that causes delusions and that at least one
medical expert diagnoses; (2) a comprehensively documented history
of that diagnosed mental illness; (3) uncontradicted evidence of that
mental illness; and (4) indications that any intoxication that may
have contributed to the defendant’s crime was not the sole source of
their behavior.249
Especially compelling is the degree to which both prosecutorial
and defense experts converge in their assessments of a defendant.
While both law and science can be adversarial, this type of consensus seemingly evokes the kinds of goals that criminal justice actors
should share. After all, the insanity defense should spare from
punishment individuals who are rendered incapable of appreciating
the nature and consequences of their acts or determining the difference between right and wrong. What follows are depictions of
some of those individuals.

248. See generally Deborah W. Denno, How Courts in Criminal Cases Respond to Childhood
Trauma, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 301 (2019) (showing the results of an empirical study linking
childhood trauma to criminality).
249. See supra Part III.C.
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1. Police Officer at the Elbow: People v. Armstrong
In People v. Armstrong, the defendant, Freddie Armstrong, appealed a second degree murder conviction and, after a second appeal
and remand, was successfully rendered insane at the time of the
killing.250 The facts are among the most violent in this group of
successful cases, and the experts among the most strongly aligned.
In 1992, Armstrong went to Loche’s Mortuary in Bastrop, Louisiana, to acquire a copy of his father’s death certificate.251 When one
of the two people in the office started to help him, Armstrong opened
a briefcase containing a large butcher knife, and the person left to
get help.252 The second person in the office, Reverend Fred Neal, was
left alone.253 Moments later, Officer Billy Womack arrived in the
mortuary’s office and witnessed Armstrong standing over Neal with
a bloody knife.254
Although Officer Womack asked Armstrong what was wrong,
Armstrong “just stared at him,” ignored his request, ascended a
stairway as other officers arrived, and descended the stairway back
to the office again.255 With Officer Womack and the other officers
watching, Armstrong decapitated Neal.256 “Grinning, [Armstrong]
picked up the head by the ears and held it up for the officers to
see.”257 In Officer Womack’s words, Armstrong “appeared to be a
person possessed.”258 After “put[ting] the head down, [Armstrong]
picked up Rev. Neal’s headless body and placed it in a chair, picked
up the head, and walked upstairs and dropped it in the toilet.”259
Then, when Armstrong returned downstairs, he set the knife in the
briefcase and walked toward the entrance, never responding to the
officers who admitted not feeling threatened by him despite his

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

671 So. 2d 307, 308, 313 (La. 1996).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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strange and violent behavior.260 The officers then arrested Armstrong for murder.261
Evidence showed that Armstrong, also a minister, stabbed Neal
more than twenty times, and that Neal died of a chest wound.262
While initially a trial court found Armstrong incompetent to stand
trial and ordered him institutionalized, he was later rendered
competent.263 At trial, despite medical testimony from Armstrong’s
history and from experts, the jury accepted the narrative that
Armstrong could distinguish between right and wrong based on the
M’Naghten standard.264 According to the court, not only was Armstrong able to communicate with others before the killing, he may
have been motivated by revenge.265 Indeed, as the prosecutor and a
physician expert concluded, Armstrong behaved normally on the
morning of the homicide, arguing that “even a paranoid schizophrenic in a psychotic state can know the difference between right
and wrong.”266
On appeal, however, a wide range of medical experts converged
to offer a different narrative of Armstrong. They recounted Armstrong’s vast numbers of disabilities in great detail—a “twenty-five
year history of mental illness with delusions, auditory hallucinations, religious obsessions and occasional psychotic episodes, particularly when defendant was subjected to stress or failed to take his
medication.”267 Indeed, Armstrong, a veteran who had been “medically discharged from the service as a paranoid schizophrenic,” had
been admitted to mental institutions continuously between 1969
and 1992 and was released only three days before the killing of
Neal.268 Most importantly, three psychiatrists and one psychologist
insisted that Armstrong could not tell the difference between right
and wrong when he killed Neal and that he was experiencing
psychotic episodes.269 The court stressed Armstrong’s violence and
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 308-09; see also supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
Armstrong, 671 So. 2d at 309.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 312.
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“extensive evidence of bizarre behavior, before and after the killing,
which was consistent with conduct that has led to his numerous
hospitalizations.”270 The court later rendered Armstrong insane.271
Critical to Armstrong’s case were the numbers of unified experts
and their capacity to link Armstrong’s mental illness to his behavior. For example, all experts who testified, including one state
physician, agreed that the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.272 In the court’s view, “the most significant evidence of
ability to distinguish right from wrong in many insanity defense
cases is evidence of the accused’s attempts to hide evidence of the
crime,” which Armstrong did not do.273 Indeed, the court stressed
that “the fact that defendant decapitated Rev. Neal in view of
several police officers militates strongly against a conclusion that he
knew he was doing wrong at the time.”274 Similar themes exist in
the following case.
2. Crime in Broad Daylight with No Attempt to Flee:
State v. Currie
In State v. Currie, a jury convicted Robert Currie, a fifteen-yearold, of second degree murder for stabbing his mother twenty-four
times and of second degree attempted murder for stabbing his
friend while in New Orleans.275 Directly before the stabbings, Currie
met up with friends interested in vampirism and the occult to drink
alcohol, smoke marijuana, and take LSD.276 Afterwards, police found
that Currie had cut his own wrists and used his blood to write
messages on the victims’ hotel mirror.277 Currie’s friend and surviving victim, Gene Battistelli, testified that Currie heard voices the
night before the crime and believed himself to be an immortal
vampire.278 According to Battistelli’s testimony, on some occasions

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 313.
Id.
812 So. 2d 128, 129 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 129-30.
See id. at 130-31.
See id. at 131.
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he believed that Currie “might not know who he was,” and also that
Currie said at times “that he wished he had a gun so that he could
kill himself.”279 In addition, Battistelli thought that Currie “was
acting strange ... because of the drugs.”280
At trial, several defense experts testified about Currie’s family
history of mental illness and that Currie suffered from severe psychosis and schizophrenia for several years.281 The State presented
one rebuttal expert witness, Dr. Harminder Mallik, who agreed that
Currie had a mental disorder but did not think the disorder
rendered him to be “incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong.”282 Mallik also determined that Currie suffered from hallucinogenic intoxication, but was otherwise sane.283
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana reversed the
conviction, finding that the facts of the case did not support Dr.
Mallik’s assessment.284 The court stated that it could not “imagine
a case wherein an insanity defense could possibly be more strong.”285
Currie was a victim of childhood trauma, had suffered brain damage
at birth, was diagnosed with schizophrenia by age eleven, and had
been off his antipsychotic medication for over one year before the
murder.286 In addition, the facts of the crime were indicative of
insanity: Currie “committed the crimes in broad daylight in front of
many witnesses. He did not attempt to flee. He was found within
minutes in a trance-like state. After admitting he had killed his
mother, he asked for her comfort shortly thereafter.”287 The court
stressed that “[t]hese do not appear to be the acts of a man who can
distinguish right from wrong.”288 In dismissing Dr. Mallik’s
testimony, the court explained that the expert’s “conclusion of
hallucinogenic intoxication was based almost exclusively on
interviews with the defendant who reported his own drug use to
the doctor at a time when he was psychotic” and that “[t]here was
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 131-34.
Id. at 134.
See id. at 138.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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little corroboration of the history of his drug [use] by independent
or objective sources.”289
As with the Armstrong case, Currie’s extreme violence, committed
publicly with no attempt to hide, appeared most convincing to the
court. Likewise, the State introduced only one expert who had not
employed any neuroscientific measures or otherwise “independent
or objective sources” to verify his conclusions.290
3. Juvenile Committing Patricide: People v. Baker
In People v. Baker, the defendant, Kenneth Baker, shot and killed
both of his parents in their home and confessed while at a police station.291 According to Baker, he got into an argument with his father
and became upset.292 Baker then retrieved a gun before saying to his
father, “[t]he father dies before the son.”293 When his father moved
toward Baker’s throat, Baker fired several shots until his father
fell.294 Baker then shot and stabbed his mother and returned to his
father to stab him again.295 Afterward, Baker got into his car to
drive to Las Vegas, ultimately driving his car off a highway.296
Before he killed his parents, Baker was periodically hospitalized for
psychiatric problems and—as evidenced by the testimony of his
family and friends—exhibited bouts of erratic behavior.297 The trial
court found Baker guilty but mentally ill, and he appealed.298
Four experts testified to Baker’s mental state,299 and there was a
substantial consensus among them. A psychiatrist, Dr. Glenn Prentice, interviewed Baker, reviewed his records, and, based on this information, opined that Baker suffered from schizophrenia and was
unable to appreciate the criminality of his behavior.300 Three other
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
625 N.E.2d 719, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 723-24.
See id. at 726.
Id. at 724.
Id.

1268

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1215

experts agreed with Dr. Prentice’s assessment after interviewing
Baker and reviewing his reports: a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Matthew Markos, a clinical psychologist, Dr. Michael Rabin, and another medical expert, Dr. Albert Stipes, who, along with Dr. Rabin,
worked at the county psychiatric institute.301 All three experts
stated that Baker suffered from a schizo-affective disorder and concurred with Dr. Prentice that “the difference present[ed] in the
diagnoses [Dr. Prentice’s “schizophrenia” vs. their “schizo-affective
disorder” was] ‘an academic one’ and that it did not change the
ultimate determination [of] insanity.”302 In addition, all four experts
reached a consensus that Baker did not exhibit signs of malingering.303 Strikingly, no expert witness testified on behalf of the
State.304
With this level of expert unity in mind, the court found that the
trial court erred in rejecting the expert testimony and rendered
Baker not guilty by reason of insanity.305 While the trier of fact may
accept or reject expert testimony or rely on lay testimony, the court
concluded that there was no basis to reject the expert testimony in
this case.306 As the court emphasized, all experts relied substantially “on records of events shortly after the incident,” all interviewed
the defendant, and “[w]ithout exception, all of the experts concluded
that defendant lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct and could not conform his conduct to the
requirements of law as a result of his mental disease or defect at the
time of the crime.”307 Likewise, all experts’ conclusions were bolstered by Baker’s “prior hospitalization for the same disease six
months prior to the killings.”308

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 725-26.
Id. at 725.
See id.
See id. at 727.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
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4. Attempted Murder of a Police Officer: Dixon v. State
In Dixon v. State, a jury convicted the defendant, Brenda Ann
Dixon, a forty-year-old practicing attorney in Tuscaloosa, Alabama,
of attempted murder of a police officer and sentenced her to twenty
years in prison.309 On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Alabama held “that the evidence of [the defendant’s] insanity was
both overwhelming and uncontradicted,” overcame the presumption
of sanity, and entitled her to an acquittal.310 The court’s recital of
the facts of this case provided a basis for the insanity defense.
On the day of the incident, a Sunday evening, Dixon was “walking
down the median” of a Tuscaloosa boulevard when she encountered
two police officers.311 One officer stated that Dixon seemed “to be
very paranoid, thinking somebody was after her;” Dixon also did not
believe they were police officers even though they were wearing uniforms.312 About an hour later, Dixon went to a convenience store and
asked the manager to call the state troopers because she believed
she was being followed.313 She specifically told him not to contact the
Tuscaloosa police.314 The manager did as Dixon requested, but when
the troopers informed him that he should call the police, he complied.315 Upon hearing the manager’s phone call, Dixon left and went
to a park while Officer Tina Williams arrived at the store.316 The
store manager conveyed to Officer Williams that Dixon “looked
‘spaced out’ and was ‘acting very strange,’” and the police radio dispatch had characterized Dixon as “an ‘[u]nwanted guest acting
crazy.’”317 Officer Williams then went to the park to offer Dixon assistance, but Dixon “jumped out from behind the trees, made a ‘karate kick sound,’ and charged at Officer Williams,” knocking the
officer down, then wrestling, kicking, and scratching her.318 Dixon
also managed to grab Officer Williams’s revolver from its holster
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

668 So. 2d 65, 65-66 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
Id. at 71-73.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
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and point it at the officer’s chest, at which point Officer Williams
knocked it away.319 However, the weapon discharged and caused
Officer Williams a scalp injury, nearly missing a shot through her
head.320 One day later, doctors evaluated Dixon and diagnosed her
“as suffering from ‘delusional disorder, persecutory type.’”321 The
trial court declared her incompetent to stand trial; however, she was
later treated and restored to competency.322
During the appeal, the prosecution argued that Dixon’s “paranoia
on the night of the offense was caused by her ingestion of Valium
and diet pills,”323 a claim strongly countered by the defense who
characterized the defendant’s mental illness as a delusional disorder exacerbated by substance abuse324 and introduced into the
record the results of a CT scan.325 While the defense’s expert presumably used the scan to form the diagnosis of psychotic delusional disorder, the court did not discuss the scan’s exact results.326
Nonetheless, the court found the defense expert’s testimony reliable,
as it was based “on psychological tests, a social and family history,
‘a CT scan’ of [Dixon’s] brain, a drug screen, and voluminous records
outlining the nearly identical conclusions of four other mental
health professionals.”327
According to the defense expert, Dixon “really thought she was in
danger” from Officer Williams and was convinced that her actions
were appropriate and necessary.328 The court emphasized the importance of such expert testimony, noting that “[a]lthough expert
opinion is not binding on the jury and may be rejected, ‘it may not
be arbitrarily ignored, and some reason must be objectively present
for ignoring expert opinion testimony.’”329 In addition, “the State’s
own evidence belied any theory that [Dixon] was functioning within

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 70 (quoting United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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a ‘lucid interval’ on the night in question.”330 Ultimately, the court
deemed the defendant insane because, due to a severe mental disease, she could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her acts.331
Evidence of the defendant’s insanity was “both overwhelming and
uncontradicted” based on the defense expert’s testimony.332
As in the other cases, the defense expert here shaped the
narrative about Dixon using multiple and comprehensive measures
of Dixon’s mental state, including a CT scan. Such thoroughness
was also strengthened substantially by the “nearly identical
conclusions of four other mental health professionals.”333 This
approach countered the possibility of a more damning narrative for
Dixon given her drug use and attempt to murder a police officer—features that could quickly come to the fore in other cases in
which experts may not agree.
5. Going to Heaven: People v. Wilhoite
In People v. Wilhoite, a jury found the defendant, Deborah Wilhoite, guilty of the attempted murder of her nine-year-old daughter,
and the court sentenced her to ten years in prison.334 Wilhoite appealed, arguing that she proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that she was insane.335
At trial, the parties agreed that, if Wilhoite’s nine-year-old
daughter, Tiffany, were to testify, she would tell the court that on
the evening of February 28, 1988, she saw Wilhoite attempt to
throw her fourteen-month-old brother out of a window of their
eighth-floor apartment while saying, “We have been saved and are
going to heaven.”336 After her older sister, Ava, pulled her brother
away from Wilhoite and sought safety, Wilhoite tried to throw
Tiffany out of the window instead.337 Tiffany managed to hold onto
a curtain until a neighbor intervened and pulled her back into the
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71-72.
592 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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apartment unharmed.338 The Illinois Appellate Court considered
the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of three
defense psychiatrists.339 All three experts agreed that Wilhoite was
“unable to conform her behavior to the requirements of the law due
to the condition of brief reactive psychosis.”340 In rebuttal, the
State’s psychiatrist, Dr. Werner Tuteur, testified that Wilhoite was
legally sane and under the influence of cannabis at the time of the
incident.341 Wilhoite reported that she smoked marijuana fifteen
minutes before the incident and did not recall what transpired.342
However, according to the defense, Wilhoite’s psychosis was not
related to drug use but instead caused by a series of stressors,
including financial difficulty and the current knowledge that her
live-in boyfriend molested her daughter.343
The trial court found the State expert’s diagnosis of “‘voluntary
cannabis intoxication caused by the frequency of the defendant’s
use’ to be ‘more logical.’”344 Upon review of the available evidence,
the appellate court disagreed, finding many foundational flaws in
Dr. Tuteur’s diagnosis of voluntary intoxication, which “fatally
undermine[d] his opinion that defendant was legally sane at the
time of the offense.”345 Dr. Tuteur never attempted to ascertain how
much marijuana Wilhoite smoked, which made “his opinion
attributing defendant’s conduct to cannabis intoxication rather than
to brief reactive psychosis ... untenable.”346 The evidence also
showed that “the textbook source Dr. Tuteur professe[d] to use as
guidance in diagnosing [Wilhoite’s] condition virtually negate[d]
his conclusion and support[ed] those of defendant’s experts.”347 One
defense expert, Dr. Robert Reifman, argued that Wilhoite used
marijuana consistently for ten years and never before suffered an
338. Id.
339. Id. at 50.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 50-51. The state expert, Dr. Tuteur, conceded that he did not know exactly how
much marijuana the defendant smoked before the incident. Id. at 51. Take note that the
opinion itself wrongly spells Dr. Tuteur’s name as “Tutuer.” Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 52.
345. Id. at 54.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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adverse reaction.348 The court agreed that the defendant’s symptoms went far beyond the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders’ definition of cannabis intoxication.349 Yet, Tiffany’s testimony of her mother’s comments regarding being saved
and going to heaven on the night in question clearly established
that Wilhoite suffered from delusion.350 Thus, the appellate court
reversed the conviction, finding that “the manifest weight of the
evidence at trial established that it was more likely than not that
defendant was insane at the time of the offense.”351
In different ways, each of these cases exemplifies how experts
create a narrative of the defendant’s behavior and how courts respond. The narrative for insanity cases must be particularly compelling for the defense because insanity is exceedingly difficult to
prove. Because both the defense and the prosecution can devise a
narrative, the “battle of the experts” can be crucial in determining
a case’s outcome. Courts are significantly influenced by a diversity
of evidence and a consensus among experts. Thus, the defense’s
strongest approach is to eliminate the battle entirely, so that
experts align in writing the defendant’s insanity story. To the extent
that neuroscientific evidence can help us promote this strategy
allows us to imagine a fairer and more efficient future for law and
neuroscience.
B. The Prosecution’s Narrative
In insanity cases, prosecutors also have a narrative for the defendant, although it is harder to detect in successful cases because
most are overwhelmed with the defendant’s evidence. According to
the results of the Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study, one of the
strongest arguments a prosecutor can make for rebutting defense
evidence is that the defendant is malingering, that is, feigning or
faking mental illness symptoms.352

348. Id. at 55.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 55-56.
351. Id. at 58.
352. See Seth Feuerstein et al., Malingering and Forensic Psychiatry, 2 PSYCHIATRY 25, 2527 (2005).
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1. Evidence of Defendant’s Malingering
As The Study’s Figure 7 shows, over time, malingering issues in
insanity cases have increased dramatically—from 3 percent (3
cases) in the 1900s to 25 percent (45 cases) of insanity cases in the
2010s.353 In the 2000s, such cases rose as high as nearly one-third
(32 percent) of all insanity cases. This eight-to-ten-fold increase is
telling about prosecutorial approaches in insanity cases; yet, the
incline could also generally impact the use of neuroscientific evidence in court, irrespective of its purpose. For example, false determinations of malingering can potentially cause “adverse outcomes,
such as denial of treatment or offense enhancement,” effectively
controverting the overarching goals of the criminal justice system.354

353. See infra Figure 7.
354. See generally Mary Alice Conroy & Phylissa P. Kwartner, Malingering, 2 APPLIED
PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 29, 29-32 (2006).
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Figure 7. Percentage of Insanity Defense Cases in Which
Malingering Was an Issue from 1900-2020: 3,300 Total Cases355

What is “malingering” in the context of psychiatric diagnoses and
insanity cases? The American Psychiatric Association provides some
guidance in the Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-V).356 While controversial, the DSM “is often
referred to as the psychiatric profession’s diagnostic Bible.”357 The
355. In Figure 7, the total number of insanity cases where malingering was an issue
between 1900 and 2020 is 338. The breakdown per decade is as follows: 1900s-3 cases, 1910s-2
cases, 1920s-5 cases, 1930s-7 cases, 1940s-10 cases, 1950s-20 cases, 1960s-31 cases, 1970s-49
cases, 1980s-94 cases, 1990s-27 cases, 2000s-47 cases, 2010s-45 cases. See Statistical
Appendix, at 360-63 (on file with author).
356. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
726 (5th ed. 2013).
357. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, ‘‘God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?,
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DSM-V also offers an official definition of malingering that courts
and professionals commonly reference and that many experts use
when evaluating defendants.358 According to the DSM-V, “[t]he
essential feature of malingering is the intentional production of
false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms,
motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty,
avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal
prosecution, or obtaining drugs.”359
The DSM-V also states that malingering should be strongly
suspected if any combination of the following is noted when examining the patient:
(1) Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the individual is
referred by an attorney to the clinician for examination)[;] ...
(2) [m]arked discrepancy between the individual’s claimed
stress or disability and the objective findings[;] ... (3) [l]ack of
cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying
with the prescribed treatment regimen[;] (4) the presence of
antisocial personality disorder.360

As The Study showed, on rare occasion, defense experts will
identify a defendant’s malingering; however, the prosecution makes
the argument nearly exclusively. A finding of malingering can be
very persuasive and can sometimes affect the court’s judgment.361
Indeed, testifying experts have stressed that “[a]n inaccurate diagnosis of malingering by an expert does a major disservice to justice”
because it can wrongly result in longer sentences.362 Likewise, the

38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 1023 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
358. See Feuerstein et al., supra note 352, at 25.
359. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 356, at 726.
360. See id. at 727.
361. See Bench v. State, 431 P.3d 929, 976 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (finding that, because
several defense experts and various tests confirmed malingering, the outcome of the case
would not have been different had the defendant been afforded the opportunity to call one of
his experts for surrebuttal); see also State v. Rojas, 592 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ohio 1992)
(concluding that the defendant was malingering, which led the court to determine an expert’s
diagnosis of mental retardation to not be credible).
362. James L. Knoll IV & Phillip J. Resnick, U.S. v. Greer: Longer Sentences for
Malingerers, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 621, 624 (1999).
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legal implications of malingering are severe: “such a diagnosis
should not be made unless there is a high degree of certainty.”363
2. Implications of Malingering
The Study shows that, even though malingering was infrequently brought forth in early twentieth-century insanity cases, courts
still allowed such evidence into testimony, thus setting the foundation for modern arguments.364 In People v. Krauser, for example,
experts disagreed regarding whether the defendant was insane or
feigning symptoms of insanity.365 The defendant, Walter Krauser,
was one of the only two defendants to undergo what then mimicked
brain imaging in The Study’s earliest decades.366 Defense experts
took “[r]adio pictures” of Krauser’s skull that showed a “thickening
over the back of the occipital bone, encroaching somewhat upon the
space that should be occupied by the part of the brain known as the
cerebellum.”367 Krauser also underwent a range of mental and
psychological tests.368 Based on these tests, the defense expert concluded that Krauser was “of subnormal—of feebleminded— intelligence” and had the mental age of an eight-year-old.369 According to
two doctors who testified for the State, Krauser was not feebleminded or insane and was, in fact, feigning his insanity.370 The court
ultimately reversed Krauser’s conviction based on an improper jury
instruction on insanity, concluding that Krauser “had a right to
have his case submitted to the jury on the evidence introduced in
the case” and was “entitled to have the jury accurately instructed”
on the insanity issue.371 Krauser also benefitted from having a
defense team that gathered an enormous amount of family history
and medical information, thus validating his conditions and
behaviors.

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
See supra Figure 7.
146 N.E. 593, 596 (Ill. 1925).
See Statistical Appendix, at 349 (on file with author).
Krauser, 146 N.E. at 596.
See id. at 596-97.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 606.
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Yet, Krauser’s case was an early outlier win against a prosecutor’s malingering claim. The Study’s last three decades of cases tell
a different story. As Figure 7 shows, malingering appeared in over
one-fifth of insanity cases from 1990 to 2020 and served as a
common basis for rejection of defendants’ insanity defenses.372 For
example, in People v. Stack, the testimony of malingering and
general disagreement among experts regarding the defendant’s
actual mental condition led the appellate court to accept the trial
court’s rejection of the defendant’s insanity defense.373 The State
called a clinical psychologist, Dr. Linda Grossman, who testified
that the defendant’s various psychological test results were
consistent with malingering and that the defendant exaggerated
symptoms of a mental disorder.374 One other State expert, Dr. Henry
Lihmeyer, agreed, emphasizing that the defendant’s alleged
delusions were untruthful.375 This evidence strongly affected the
trial court: “I find that [the defendant] is a manipulator. He has
fooled some of the examiners and used his skills as a malingerer
and a manipulator in an attempt to avoid responsibility for his
actions.”376 Holding that the State met its burden of proof, the court
rendered the defendant guilty of first degree murder for the murder
of his wife and son.377
Predictably, efforts to prove malingering will be a powerful
prosecutorial tactic in the future, given its increasing use over 120
years.378 While the criminal justice system wants of course to find
truth, defendants face serious repercussions when confronted by an
erroneous malingering claim. Such a strategy also plays into our
worst fears about how neuroscientific techniques can be used in
dubious ways.379 Without The Study’s research results, we would not
be aware of the speed and significance of malingering tests, especially given the spotlight placed on brain imaging. With data

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See supra Figure 7.
724 N.E.2d 79, 88-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 85.
See id.
Id. at 86.
Id.
See supra Figure 5.
See Conroy & Kwartner, supra note 354, at 32.
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comes the foresight to prepare for a future with law and neuroscience and all that such a combination may bring.
CONCLUSION
The past foretells our future, or so the story goes. Progress in
neuroscience has enabled experts to create intricate narratives
about the defendants they are testifying for or against in their
battles, while also allowing courts to peer into defendants’ brains
and minds. Even as these technologies develop, the criminal justice
system will still heavily rely on narratives crafted by expert
testimony, as we have seen from the past 120 years.380
While experts will always be the essential interpreters of all
things neuroscience, perhaps we should think differently about
them as we head into the future. We know experts are not always
accurate with their courtroom stories. Much like the Phineas Gage
case, there is a risk of narrative misdirection. Imagining a future of
law and neuroscience is recognizing that adversarial models in law
and science will perpetuate divisiveness until both systems can take
on an alternative—more unified—transformation.
Can neuroscientific advances help history from repeating itself
with more precise, objective, and verifiable creations? If so, criminal
justice experts may find an interpretative consensus more readily.
And reaching that goal may be one of the neuroscience profession’s
most outstanding achievements.

380. See Statistical Appendix, at 265-336 (on file with author).
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APPENDIX A
I. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: CASE SEARCHES, THE CODING
PROCESS, AND CODING INSANITY
A. Case Searches
My Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study involved examining 8,358
criminal law cases addressing neuroscientific evidence in any capacity from January 1, 1900, to December 31, 2020. These cases
were systemically collected from the Westlaw and Lexis legal databases. This Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study is an expansion of
my comparable Two-Decade Neuroscience Study of every criminal
case that addressed neuroscientific evidence from 1992-2012.381 I expanded the Two-Decade Neuroscience Study to twelve decades to acquire a larger sample size and more opportunities to investigate
time trends. Thus, while the methodologies for both my two-decade
and twelve-decade studies are similar, this Appendix focuses on my
Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study.
Case searches for the Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study (“The
Study”) were conducted in phases by two research attorneys highly
experienced in law and neuroscience and who shared the same
techniques and strategies. I refer to these attorneys as “Research
Attorney One” and “Research Attorney Two.” To create a dataset for
The Study, both research attorneys conducted extensive searches of
Westlaw and Lexis to find all neuroscience-related criminal law
cases. The objective of these searches was to collect all criminal
cases from January 1, 1900, to December 31, 2020, in which courts
considered neuroscientific evidence in some way. Neuroscientific
evidence was operationally defined according to search terms pertaining to a defendant or a victim in a case.

381. For a discussion of this Two-Decade Study, see generally Denno, supra note 29, at 500501 (detailing the variables and methodology for the Two-Decade Study). Nearly a dozen
articles and book chapters, as well as a forthcoming book, stem from the Two-Decade Study.
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1. Search Terms
Research Attorney One and Research Attorney Two searched
reported cases for both state and federal courts, thereby creating a
dataset that included every relevant case in the country. The attorneys used three sets of search terms. The first set of search
terms, which pertained to neuroimaging, targeted specific types of
commonly used brain scans mentioned in close proximity to terms
relevant to “neuro” or any reference to the brain. This search took
the following format: (neuro! or brain /250) and (MRI or fMRI or
“PET scan” or “CT scan” or “CAT scan” or SPECT or EEG or BEEM
or BEAM or “brain fingerprinting”).
The second set of search terms targeted cases in which expert
witnesses discussed neuroscientific evidence. The strategy recognized that expert witnesses in the medical or neuroscientific fields
would appear in close proximity to their credentials. It employed the
following search construction: (neuro! /200 Dr.), (psych! /200 Dr.),
(neuro! AND mental), (mental AND psych!), brain /200 neuro!),
(brain /200 psych!), (Dr. AND mental), and (mental AND expert).
For cases decided before 1960, Research Attorney One conducted
additional searches containing period-specific terms. For example,
experts in earlier decades were called “alienists,” a term not applied
in later decades. Thus, these additional terms included the following: (physician AND expert), (physician AND insan!), (alienist AND
insan!), and (alienist AND mental).
The third set of search terms targeted criminal cases where
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were based on defense
attorneys’ failures to investigate, develop, or present neuroscientific
evidence relevant to the defendant. These searches used the
following terms: ((effectiv! or ineffectiv!) /3 assist!) /250 (neuro! or
brain or MRI or “magnetic resonance imaging” or “PET scan” or
“position emission tomography” or “CAT scan” or “CT scan” or fMRI
or BEAM or “brain fingerprinting” or EEG or SPECT).
The research attorneys conducted these searches for each of the
twelve decades, then applied Westlaw filters to narrow the cases
based on three criteria. All cases had to be (1) reported, (2) classified
as criminal or habeas corpus, and (3) decided between January 1 of
the first year of the decade and December 31 of the last year of the
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decade being searched. Westlaw filters enabled the exclusion of
cases already collected, thereby preventing duplicates in subsequent
searches. After the research attorneys implemented all filters, they
downloaded the case list in a Microsoft Excel (CSV) format.
Once saved, the research attorneys reviewed each case list to
delete irrelevant cases. This process included removing a sizable
number of noncriminal cases that somehow made it through the
“criminal or habeas corpus” Westlaw filters. Once the research
attorneys appropriately revised the list, they searched each case on
the Westlaw list to review its relevancy further and weed out false
positives. After that, the attorneys created a case list for each
decade in Microsoft Word and systematically distributed the cases
to law school research assistants for hand-coding. In total, these
case searches yielded 8,358 neuroscience cases, all of which are
included in The Study.382
2. Criteria for Relevancy
Set criteria established whether The Study would include a
particular case. A court must have announced a disposition in a case
where a party either introduced or sought to introduce neuroscientific evidence at any point in the proceeding (for example,
innocence-or-guilt phase, penalty phase, post-conviction hearing,
evidentiary hearing, et cetera). The Study only included cases in
which neuroscientific evidence was introduced post-trial if the court
took action based on that evidence. Such action could include
granting an evidentiary hearing, finding ineffective assistance of
counsel, or finding prior court error for failure to admit the evidence.
For example, The Study contains several post-conviction cases
where a defendant had been sentenced to death and was also
arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Study’s case search did not include individual briefs, expert
reports, or similar documents, because these materials are not
available for all cases in either the Westlaw or Lexis databases. If
multiple phases of the same case appeared in a search, research
attorneys included only the most recent case opinion, regardless of

382. See supra Figure 1.
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its phase. Also, if multiple defendants were tried in the same case,
researchers coded only for the defendant(s) to whom the neuroscientific evidence applied.
B. The Case Coding Process
1. General Case Coding
All of The Study’s cases were hand-coded (that is, coded by a
person rather than a machine). This approach captured the vast
legal, scientific, and factual variability existing in these cases and
therefore ensured greater precision. Coding cases thoroughly and
accurately was critical to The Study’s reliability and validity.
Research Attorney One was primarily responsible for supervising
J.D. student research assistants for the case coding. Case coding is
a data collection method that requires a J.D. student to read an
assigned criminal case carefully and then input information into
various categories within a Microsoft Excel document. This coding
scheme provided general facts and data for each relevant case and
enabled researchers to systematically tabulate the specific neuroscientific evidence presented. In sum, the coding process required a
J.D. student research assistant to read the case opinion in full and
fill out a document designed for coding with information specific to
each case opinion.
For my Two-Decade Neuroscience Study, a template was created
in 2012 in Microsoft Excel entitled, “The Neuroscience Coding
Template—General.” The document was revised in 2019 and again
in 2020 to accommodate the ten added decades constituting my
Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study. Thus, J.D. student research
assistants used the 2020 version of “The Neuroscience Coding
Template—General” to code each of the 8,358 cases in my TwelveDecade Neuroscience Study.
In addition to neuroscientific evidence, other data were critical to
The Study, such as a case’s procedural history, court decision and
holding, defenses, and more. The Study’s Coding Template was organized into twelve different sections, outlined as follows: (1) Case
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Name/Identifier,383 (2) Basic Case Information,384 (3) Sentencing,385
(4) Funding for Neuroscientific Evidence and Testimony,386 (5)
Future Dangerousness,387 (6) Malingering,388 (7) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,389 (8) Brain Scans,390 (9) Purpose of Neuroscientific
Evidence,391 (10) Findings By Medical Professionals,392 (11) Other
Relevant Evidence,393 and (12) Comments.394

383. Case Name/Identifier: This section includes the full case citation and identifies the
case by its date and jurisdiction.
384. Basic Case Information: This section lists basic facts about each case, such as the
case’s procedural history or whether neuroscientific evidence was related to the defendant,
victim, witness, convicted crimes, or the holding.
385. Sentencing: This section specifies the defendant’s sentence.
386. Funding for Neuroscientific Evidence and Testimony: This section pertains to all
information relating to funding requests, such as the type of evidence for which funding was
requested, whether funding was granted or denied, and other relevant details.
387. Future Dangerousness: This section concerns details relating to the defendant’s future
dangerousness, such as whether neuroscientific evidence was used to support such a finding
or there existed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
388. Malingering: This section includes details related to a finding or suspicion of
malingering, such as whether the finding affected the court’s judgment or was supported by
expert testimony. The section also noted the particular ailment the defendant was purportedly
feigning, and whether a psychological test actually revealed malingering.
389. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: This section focuses on details related to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, including the basis for such a claim and whether the claim
was accepted or denied.
390. Brain Scans: This section is separated into six different sections: (1) Stage at Which
Brain Scan was Performed, (2) Type of Brain Scan (for example, MRI, EEG, or CT/CAT Scan),
(3) Introducing Party (defense or State), (4) Brain Examined (Defendant or Victim), (5) Brain
Scan Details (including whether the brain scan was accepted or denied as evidence), and (6)
Brain Scan Findings (including findings such as brain damage and brain abnormality).
391. Purpose of Neuroscientific Evidence: This section specifies what type of defense or
claim neuroscientific evidence was used to support. Examples include insanity, diminished
capacity, incompetency, mitigation, or the extent of a victim’s injuries.
392. Findings by Medical Professionals: This section outlines the findings of medical
experts, including evidence of a defendant or victim’s brain damage, mental illness, mental
impairment, or neurological disorders.
393. Other Relevant Evidence: This section pertains to various findings presented by
medical experts, lay witnesses, the defendant’s testimony, or other sources. Such findings
include indications of a defendant’s substance abuse, childhood trauma, behavioral or
emotional problems, and developmental issues, in addition to details related to non-imaging
testing.
394. Comments: This section provides a detailed description of the court’s decision and
holding and other relevant evidence not specified in prior categories. It also includes coders’
comments regarding identified trends, interesting facts, and unusual circumstances.
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2. Training Coders
Over seventy-five J.D. student research assistants have worked
as coders since 2012 at Fordham Law School. Most coders participated in the Two-Decade Neuroscience Study, and about twenty
others have participated in the Twelve-Decade Neuroscience
Study.395 Research Attorney One was responsible for training all
coders in the Twelve-Decade Neuroscience Study and many coders
in the Two-Decade Neuroscience Study.
Each year, Research Attorney One holds a three to five-day
training session for Fordham student research assistants working
as coders. For this purpose, Research Attorney One uses a fortypage manual that details the coding process. Student coders are assigned in rotating pairs to code and then compare their coding of the
same cases to build inter-rater reliability. Research Attorney One
then personally checks and reviews the accuracy of every coding
sheet a student submits and makes any necessary edits. Research
Attorney One and this author also communicate with each coder
throughout the day and answer questions. Students code in pairs
until Research Attorney One and this author believe their work is
consistently accurate; then, they can code alone. Some coders have
worked with us throughout their law school education.
C. Coding Insanity Cases
1. General Coding
The results of the general coding for all cases in The Study cases,
as just described, can also be used for more specific and in-depth
coding projects. For example, for this Article’s neuroscience and
insanity defense project, Research Attorney One identified cases in
the general coding list that contained an insanity defense or issue
for the last three decades: 1990-2020. Fordham J.D. student research assistants then coded these cases separately and more
thoroughly using a new coding template.

395. The names of the coders are on file with the author.
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More specifically, Research Attorney One identified a total of 550
cases involving an insanity defense or issue between January 1,
1990, and December 31, 2020.396 Research Attorney One then
assigned these cases for coding. As with all coding, Research
Attorney One carefully reviewed each student’s work and made any
necessary edits. After the coding was complete, Research Attorney
One combined the students’ coding documents into one Excel document entitled, “Final Neuroscience Coding: Insanity 1990-2020.”
Once combined, Research Attorney One conducted a final review to
ensure that all cases were relevant and all data were accurate. The
“Final Neuroscience Coding: Insanity 1990-2020” document serves
as the basis for the various charts and empirical evidence this
Article analyzes.
For the neuroscience and insanity defense project, coders relied
on a template entitled, “Neuroscience Coding Template: Insanity
1990-2020.” In contrast to “The Neuroscience Coding Template—
General,” this more tailored template included categories specific
to the insanity defense. For the purposes of this Article’s analyses,
this insanity-specific document included twelve different categories
broken down as follows: (1) Case Name/Identifier,397 (2) Insanity Issue,398 (3) Insanity Test,399 (4) Basis for Insanity Claim,400 (5) Neuroscientific Evidence Related to Insanity,401 (6) Type of Expert Used
to Support or Refute Insanity Defense,402 (7) Type of Neuroimaging

396. See supra Figure 2.
397. Case Name/Identifier: This section includes the full case citation and identifies the
case by its date and jurisdiction.
398. Insanity Issue: This section lists the type(s) of insanity issues present in each case,
including, for example, whether the defendant argued an insanity defense or whether an
insanity defense should have been presented.
399. Insanity Test: This section provides each type of insanity test used or referenced in
each case, for example, M’Naghten or the ALI Model Penal Code.
400. Basis for Insanity Claim: This section indicates what evidence served as the basis for
the defendant’s insanity claim. Examples include evidence of a mental illness or neurological
disorder, brain damage, and poor intellectual functioning.
401. Neuroscientific Evidence Related to Insanity: This section details the type(s) of
neuroscientific evidence that was presented in connection with an insanity claim, including
expert testimony, brain imaging, and non-imaging tests.
402. Type of Expert Used to Support or Refute Insanity Defense: This section specifies the
type(s) of experts that was used by the defense and/or prosecution either to support or refute
an insanity defense, including psychiatrists, psychologists, neurologists, physicians,
radiologists, and more.
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Used to Support or Refute Insanity Defense,403 (8) Type of NonNeuroimaging Testing Used to Support or Refute Insanity Defense,404 (9) Opposition to the Insanity Defense and Challenges to
Admissibility,405 (10) Other Claims Related to the Insanity Defense,406 (11) Court Decision and Outcome,407 (12) Comments.408 In
the future, I plan to conduct an extensive analysis of the remaining
2,750 pre-1990s insanity cases using the same empirical approach.
2. Successful Insanity Case Coding
In order to identify the successful insanity cases among the 550
insanity cases from 1990-2020, Research Attorney One reviewed the
Court Decision and Outcome section within the “Final Neuroscience
Coding: Insanity 1990-2020” coding sheet for each case. Whenever

403. Type of Neuroimaging Used to Support or Refute Insanity Defense: This section lists
the type(s) of brain imaging tests used by the defense and/or prosecution either to support or
refute an insanity defense, including MRI, EEG, CT/CAT Scan, PET, and SPECT.
404. Type of Non-Imaging Testing Used to Support or Refute Insanity Defense: This section
identifies the type(s) of non-imaging tests used by the defense and/or prosecution either to
support or refute an insanity defense, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory, the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Rorschach Test, the Wide Range
Achievement Test, and more.
405. Opposition to the Insanity Defense and Challenges to Admissibility: This section
indicates any opposition the defendant faced using the insanity defense and any challenges
to admissibility the defendant experienced concerning insanity-related evidence. Example
categories include the following: rejection of the defendant’s neuroimaging or non-imaging test
results; State expert testimony supported a finding of sanity; a finding of malingering on
behalf of the defendant was determined or suspected; and the court denied the defendant’s
request for hiring an expert to support the insanity claim.
406. Other Claims Related to the Insanity Defense: This section details other claims made
by the defendant that were related to the insanity defense. Examples include an insanityrelated ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an insanity-related Ake claim, a defense
argument that the insanity test or jury instruction was inadequate, and the defense’s
contention that the prosecutor’s conduct relating to the insanity defense was improper.
407. Court Decision and Outcome: This section specifies the court’s decision relating to the
defendant’s insanity claim and the case outcome. Examples include the court: accepting or
rejecting the defendant’s insanity defense, determining that the defendant’s insanity-related
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was either accepted or denied, concluding that the
defendant was either entitled or not entitled to an insanity instruction, finding the jury
instruction on insanity was either adequate or inadequate, and more.
408. Comments: This section provides a detailed description of the court’s decision and
holding and the insanity-related holding. It also includes other relevant evidence not specified
in prior categories, such as coders’ comments regarding identified trends, interesting facts,
and unusual circumstances.
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a court ruled in favor of the defendant in a way that related to the
defendant’s insanity defense, Research Attorney One copied and
pasted the coded case in its entirety into a new coding sheet entitled, “Successful Insanity Coding Sheet 1990-2020.” After reviewing all 550 cases, 86 cases were identified as being successful.
Once all eighty-six successful cases were identified, Research
Attorney One reviewed each case to further categorize the reasons
for success. This review process consisted of reading the coded
information within the “Successful Insanity Coding Sheet 19902020” coding sheet as well as looking up and reviewing each case
opinion on Westlaw. After each case was properly reviewed, the case
was further organized into one or more of six non-mutually exclusive categories. These categories are as follows: (1) Insanity Cases
Successful Due to Acceptance of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim, (2) Insanity Case Successful Due to Acceptance of Ake Claim,
(3) Insanity Case Successful Due to Finding of Court Error, (4) Insanity Case Successful Due to Finding of Prosecutor Error, (5) Insanity Case Successful Due to Determination that Defendant was
Entitled to an Insanity Instruction or that Jury Instruction was Inadequate, and (6) Insanity Case Successful Due to Overwhelming
Evidence of Insanity. These categories and their related case lists
are contained within a Microsoft Word document entitled, “Types of
Successful Insanity Cases 1990-2020.”
There were twenty-three cases identified in list number six as
insanity cases that were found to be successful due to overwhelming
evidence of insanity. These twenty-three cases were thus labeled
“pure insanity cases” given that the court in each case determined
that the defendants were not guilty by reason of insanity. Research
Attorney One copied and pasted these twenty-three coded cases in
their entirety into a new coding sheet entitled, “Pure Insanity
Coding Sheet 1990-2020” so further analysis could be performed.

